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INTRODUCTION
In 2000, Richard Stengel had a SynchroMed EL Pump and
Catheter manufactured by Medtronic implanted into his abdomen to
deliver pain relief medication to his spine.1 Five years later, Stengel
began to experience ascending paralysis caused by a granuloma, or an
inflammatory mass in his spine that formed at the tip of the catheter.2

1. See Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224,1227 (9th Cir. 2013).
2. Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 676 F.3d 1159, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc
granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012), and rev’d on reh’g en banc, 704 F.3d 1224 (9th
Cir. 2013).
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Surgeons then removed the catheter and most of the granuloma, but
it was not in time. The granuloma that formed at the catheter tip had
rendered Stengel permanently paraplegic.3 Stengel has since died,
allegedly from injuries he suffered in connection with the device.4
Richard Stengel is just one of the many people who have been
injured by Class III medical devices. Class III medical devices are
devices that either are used to sustain human life or present an
unreasonable risk of injury.5 In 2009, the FDA issued over 160 Class I
recalls of medical devices.6 Over the past year, over 500 medicaldevice related injuries and over 500 medical-device related deaths
were reported to the FDA.7
Preemption externalizes the harms of medical devices from the
manufacturers to the government and the public.8 In fact, the failures
associated with Medtronic’s Sprint Fidelis Leads could cost the
government and the public up to $1 billion dollars.9 A Sprint Fidelis
Lead is a pacemaker lead that provides an electrical conduit between
a pacemaker and heart, and thereby shocks the heart back into a
normal rhythm when it detects an abnormality.10 After the Sprint
Fidelis Lead was implanted into 150,000 patients, Medtronic issued a
worldwide recall, and the FDA then issued a Class I recall due to the
high failure rate associated with the leads.11 Medtronic advised that
the leads implanted into patients prior to the recall remain implanted

3. See Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1226.
4. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Stengel, 704 F.3d 1224 (No.
12-1351).
5. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii) (2012).
6. See H. DENNIS TOLLEY, EXAMINING THE SPRINT FIDELIS EFFECT ON
MEDICARE COSTS 2 (2010). A Class I recall, the most serious type, is one in which
there is a reasonable probability of serious health consequences or death. See
Background and Definitions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
safety/recalls/ucm165546.htm (last updated June 24, 2009). There also are adverse
incidents associated with medical devices that have not been recalled or extensively
litigated. For instance, the FDA has reported there have been twenty deaths and five
hundred adverse events associated with Seprafilm, an adhesion barrier used to
prevent post-surgical adhesions but there has yet to be a recall.
7. SEE FDA, Maude- Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfMAUDE/results.cfm.
8. See David Chang, Internalizing the External Costs of Medical Device
Preemption, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 283, 298 (2013).
9. See TOLLEY, supra note 6, at 19; Chang, supra note 8, at 302.
10. TOLLEY, supra note 6, at 3.
11. Id. A Sprint Fidelis Lead is a pacemaker lead that provides an electrical
conduit between the pacemaker and the heart, which shocks the heart back into a
normal rhythm if it detects an abnormality. Although for most leads there is a small
rate of failure due to fracture, Sprint Fidelis leads have failed at higher rates than
other leads. Id. at 2–3, 8.
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because of the risks involved with surgically extracting the leads.12
Instead of replacement, patients with the leads implanted are either
closely monitored, or their leads are turned off, capped, and then
replaced with another lead.13
Monitoring and replacing these leads impose significant health care
costs.14 Because about eighty-five percent of the people who were
implanted with Sprint Fidelis Leads were on Medicare, the Medicare
program has paid millions of dollars in replacement and monitoring
costs.15 If preemption did not exist—and manufacturers were forced
to internalize these costs by facing potential lawsuits—Medtronic may
have acted more quickly in addressing the defects in their leads.16
Quicker action by Medtronic could have saved the public millions, or
perhaps even $1 billion, in Medicare costs.17
In 2008, the Supreme Court in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. made it
more difficult for plaintiffs to bring common law claims against
manufacturers of Class III medical devices.18 The Riegel court
essentially preempted common law claims in which the manufacturer
complied with FDA’s pre-market approval process.19 Plaintiffs,
though, were not left without judicial recourse. The Court made clear
that parallel claims or state-law claims premised on an FDA violation
escape preemption.20 However, the “contours of the parallel claim
exception were not addressed in Riegel and are as-yet ill-defined.”21
Consequently, lower courts have adopted conflicting interpretations
of the parallel claim exception, especially in regards to two issues.22
One issue that has plagued lower courts is whether a plaintiff must
allege a violation of a generally applicable or a device-specific federal

12. See id. at 4.
13. See id.
14. Id. Making sure the leads do not fail “is a costly procedure, and each
procedure carries the risk of complications or even death. Removing the defective
lead is especially difficult because leads become imbedded into the surrounding tissue
after they are positioned into the veins connecting to the heart.” Id.
15. TOLLEY supra note 6, at 2–3; Chang, supra note 8, at 301–02.
16. Chang, supra note 8.
17. Id. at 298.
18. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 321 (2008). Under Riegel, a state law
claim is expressly preempted if it imposes requirements that are “different from or in
addition to” federal requirements. Id.
19. See id. at 332.
20. See id. at 328.
21. In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200,
1204 (8th Cir. 2010).
22. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9–11, Medtronic, Inc. v. Stengel, 134 S.
Ct. 375 (2013) (No. 12-1351).
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requirement to avoid express preemption.23 While the Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have held that the federal requirement
can be generally applicable, the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have
held that the requirement must be device-specific.24
Another issue that has been divisive for lower courts is whether
traditional state tort law claims are impliedly preempted by Buckman
Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee.25 The Sixth and Eighth Circuits
have impliedly preempted state tort law claims premised on a FDA
violation. By contrast, the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have
held that such state law tort claims are not impliedly preempted.26
For the lower federal courts to be divided over this issue of federal
law is problematic, as it is in contravention of Congress’s intent to
create a uniform framework for regulating medical devices.27
Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc. raised the very issues that have plagued
lower courts, namely, whether a claim that a manufacturer failed to
report adverse events fits within the parallel claim exception or is
preempted, either expressly or impliedly.28 The district court held
that plaintiff’s claims were expressly and impliedly preempted.29 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed, but then the full court reversed en banc.30
Medtronic filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that the Supreme
Court should clarify the contours of the parallel claim exception and
overrule the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision.31 Recently, the
Supreme Court denied Medtronic’s petition for certiorari, and thus

23. Id. at 10.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 11; Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348
(2001) (holding that plaintiff’s fraud on the FDA claim was impliedly preempted by
the statutory scheme of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
26. Id.
27. See id. at 19. Congress enacted a preemption provision in the Medical Device
Amendments of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act because states enacted varying
laws in response to medical device failures in the mid-1970s such as the Dalkon
Shield failures. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-853, at 45–46 (1976); Robert B. Leflar &
Robert S. Adler, The Preemption Pentad: Federal Preemption of Products Liability
Claims After Medtronic, 64 TENN. L. REV. 691, 703–04 (1997).
28. See generally Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013).
29. Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., CV 10-318-TUC-RCC, 2010 WL 4483970 (D. Ariz.
Nov. 9, 2010), aff’d, 676 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc granted, 686 F.3d
1121 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013).
30. Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1234; Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 676 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th
Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, 704
F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013).
31. See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 9–11.
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the confusion surrounding the parallel claim exception continues.32
Although the Supreme Court’s rationale for denial of certiorari is
unclear, it could have been persuaded by the respondents’ arguments
that Medtronic did not properly raise an argument below, or that the
Ninth Circuit’s decision lacked finality.33
This Note explores the split amongst the Circuits involving
preemption of Class III medical devices and concludes that the
Supreme Court should bridge the split in the near future. Part I
provides a background on the FDA’s statutory scheme and the
Supreme Court’s implied and express preemption doctrine in the
context of medical devices. It also explores how claims that fit within
the parallel claim exception avoid express or implied preemption.
Part II of this Note explores the diverging interpretations to parallel
claims that lower courts have adopted. Specifically, some courts have
held that state law tort claims premised on an industry-wide violation
are expressly or impliedly preempted, whereas others have held that
such claims avoid preemption entirely.
Part III outlines the
arguments made in support and opposition of certiorari in Stengel.
Finally, Part IV of this Note concludes that, based on sound public
policy and precedent, traditional state law claims premised on
violations of FDA regulations should survive both express and
implied preemption.
I. THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS AND THE PREEMPTION
DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court decisions on preemption, as well as those of
the lower courts, are based on their interpretations of The Medical
Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetics Act (FDCA). Accordingly, an understanding of the
MDA’s complex regulatory framework is crucial to understanding
these court decisions.34

32. See Michael Walsh, The Preemption Pendulum: The Supreme Court Punts
Stengel v. Medtronic, STRASBURGER FOOD & DRUG L. BLOG, (June 24, 2012),
http://www.strasburger.com/preemption-pendulum-supreme-court-punts-stengel-vmedtronic/.
33. See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition at 7–9, 20–22, Medtronic, Inc. v.
Stengel, 134 S. Ct. 375 (2013) (No. 12-1351).
34. J. David Prince, The Puzzle of Parallel Claims, Preemption, and Pleading the
Particulars, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1034, 1038–39 (2013).
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A. The FDA Approval Process
The MDA divides medical devices into three categories.35 Class I
devices, such as bandages, do “not present an unreasonable risk of
injury” and thus are subject to only general controls, such as labeling
requirements.36 Class II devices pose a greater risk than Class I
devices, and are subject to special controls, such as performance
standards and post-market surveillance measures.37 Class III devices,
such as implantable pacemaker pulse generators and heart valves,
pose the greatest risk and are subject to extensive regulations.38 A
device is classified as Class III if it cannot be classified as a Class I or
Class II device, and the device is (1) “purported or represented to be
for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is
of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human
health,” or (2) “presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or
injury.”39
Class III medical devices must undergo a rigorous pre-market
approval (PMA) process.40 Manufacturers must submit the following
to the FDA regarding Class III medical devices: (1) full reports of all
studies that have been published or should reasonably be known by
the manufacturer; (2) a full statement of the components, ingredients,
and properties of the device; (3) a full description of the methods,
facilities, and controls used for manufacturing, processing, and, when
relevant, packing and installing the device; (4) samples or device
components as requested by the FDA; and (5) a specimen of
proposed labeling.41 The FDA then reviews all of this information
and “weig[hs] any probable benefit to health from the use of the
device against any probable risk of injury or illness from such use.”42
According to the Supreme Court, the FDA spends an average of 1200

35. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2012).
36. Id. §360c(a)(1)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 880.6230, 880.5075 (2014); see also Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 316 (2008).
37. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B); 21 C.F.R. §§ 880.5860 (2014); 21 C.F.R. §
884.5460 (2014); see also Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317.
38. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)–(II); 21 C.F.R. § 870.3610 (2014); see, e.g.,
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317.
39. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317.
40. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996); see also Prince, supra note
34, at 1039.
41. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1); see also Riegel, 522 U.S. at 318. For the specific
reporting rules required in PMA application, see 21 C.F.R. § 814.20 (2014).
42. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2)(C); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 318.
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hours on each PMA submission.43 After completing its review, the
FDA can grant, deny, or condition approval on adherence to
performance standards.44 The FDA only approves the device if it
finds that (a) there is a “reasonable assurance” of the device’s “safety
and effectiveness,” and (b) the proposed labeling is neither false nor
misleading.45
The PMA process is a rigorous one, but there are three ways a
device can avoid it. The first exception “grandfathers in” devices that
are manufactured prior to the MDA’s effective date of May 28,
1976.46 Devices manufactured prior to the MDA’s effective date can
remain on the market until the FDA promulgates a regulation
requiring pre-market approval.47 The second exception allows for
devices that are “substantially equivalent” to devices on the market
prior to enactment of the MDA to go through an expedited § 510(k)
process instead of PMA.48 Most Class III devices enter the market
through § 510(k) where they are reviewed by the FDA for
equivalence but not for safety and effectiveness.49 The third
exception, known as the investigational device exemption (IDE),
allows experts to use unapproved devices in research trials involving
human subjects.50
Once a device receives pre-market approval, it is still subject to
regulatory constraints.51
After pre-market approval, the
manufacturer cannot, without FDA permission: change the design,
the manufacturing process, labeling, or any other attribute that would
affect safety or effectiveness of the device.52 If a manufacturer wants
to make such a change it must file, and the FDA must approve, a
supplemental PMA.53
The supplemental PMA application is

43. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 477. Before granting PMA approval, the FDA can also
employ outside experts to review the information or request additional information
from the manufacturer. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(G); 21 C.F.R. § 814.44(a) (2014).
44. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e; 21 C.F.R. § 861.1(b)(3) (2014); see also Riegel, 522 U.S.
at 319.
45. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 318.
46. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317.
47. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(f)(1), 360e(b)(1).
48. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1)(A).
49. “Most new Class III devices enter the market through § 510(k). In 2005, for
example, the FDA authorized the marketing of 3,148 devices under § 510(k) and
granted premarket approval to just 32 devices.” Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317 (citing PETER
HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 992 (3d ed. 2007)).
50. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g).
51. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319.
52. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(6)(A)(i); see also Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319.
53. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(6)(A)(i).
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“evaluated under largely the same criteria as an initial application.”54
However, certain changes to a device’s label after pre-market
approval do not require FDA approval.55 For instance, the “changes
being effected” regulation (CBE) allows a manufacturer to put in
effect labeling changes:
(i) that add or strengthen a contradiction warning, precaution, or
information about an adverse reaction for which there is reasonable
evidence of a causal association . . . (ii) that add or strengthen an
instruction that is intended to enhance the safe use of the
device . . . (iii) that delete misleading, false, or unsupported
indications.56

In addition to the pre-market approval requirements, a
manufacturer must also comply with the MDA’s post-approval
reporting requirements.57 These reporting requirements compel a
manufacturer to submit reports that include: (1) clinical investigations
or scientific studies concerning the device, which is known or should
be known by the manufacturer;58 and (2) incidents in which a device
“[m]ay have caused or contributed to a death or serious injury” or
malfunctioned in a manner that “would be likely to cause or
contribute to a death or serious injury, if the malfunction were to
recur.”59 Manufacturers must report death, serious injury, or
malfunction to the FDA within thirty calendar days after the
manufacturer “receive[s] or otherwise become[s] aware of
information, from any source.”60 The FDA can also obtain this postapproval information from other entities besides the manufacturer.
For instance, the MDA requires physicians, hospitals, surgical
facilities, and other health-service providers to report deaths or
serious injury associated with a Class III medical device.61

54. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319; see 21 C.F.R. § 814.39 (2014) (“[A]ll procedures and
actions that apply to an application under § 814.20 also apply to PMA supplements
except that the information required in a supplement is limited to that needed to
support the change.”).
55. Without FDA approval, a manufacturer may place into effect “i) labeling
changes that add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or
information about an adverse reaction for which there is reasonable evidence of a
causal association” or “ii) [l]abeling changes that add or strengthen an instruction
that is intended to enhance the safe use of the device.” 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(d)(2)(i)–
(iii).
56. Id.
57. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 360i.
58. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.84 (2014).
59. 21 C.F.R. § 803.50 (2014).
60. Id.
61. 21 U.S.C. § 360i.
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The FDA’s surveillance system can generally be classified as
passive because it requires manufacturers to do their own due
diligence.62
However, the FDA does have a few affirmative
obligations.
First, the FDA is required to inspect domestic
manufacturing facilities of Class III devices once every two years.63
Second, the FDA has the authority to withdraw PMA based on newly
reported or existing information, and the FDA must withdraw PMA
if it determines that the device is unsafe or ineffective under the
conditions of its labeling.64 In addition, the FDA can order a label
change based on newly acquired information;65 if the FDA
determines that the device poses an “unreasonable risk of substantial
harm to the public,” the FDA can require the manufacturer to notify
affected individuals, or repair, replace, or refund the device.66
B.

The Preemption Doctrine

In addition to pre-approval and post-approval requirements, the
MDA also contains a preemption provision. The preemption
provision set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) states that:
[N]o State . . . may establish or continue in effect with respect to a
device intended for human use any requirement—
(1)which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device
under this chapter [the FDCA].67

The preemption doctrine is derived from the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution, which states that the “Laws of the
United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”68 The Supreme Court has recognized that federal

62. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-370T, MEDICAL DEVICES
SHORTCOMINGS IN FDA’S PREMARKET REVIEW, POSTMARKET SURVEILLANCE, AND
INSPECTIONS OF DEVICE MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS 14 (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/122801.pdf.
63. 21 U.S.C. § 360(h).
64. Id. § 360e(e)(1); § 360h(e); see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312,
319–20 (2008).
65. 21 U.S.C. § 360f(a)(2).
66. Id. § 360h(a)–(b).
67. Id. § 360k.
68. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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law can preempt state law either expressly or impliedly.69 Express
preemption occurs when the text of a federal statute clearly preempts
state law.70 Implied preemption occurs when Congress intended the
federal statutory scheme to “occupy the field” (field preemption), or
when state law conflicts with federal law (conflict preemption).71 The
implied preemption analysis for medical device claims falls within the
category of conflict preemption, of which there are two kinds.72 First,
state law is impliedly preempted if it is physically impossible to
comply with both state and federal law.73 Second, state law is
impliedly preempted if that state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”74 The Supreme Court has analyzed claims involving
medical devices under the doctrine of express preemption, as well as
implied conflict/obstacle preemption.75
There are three influential Supreme Court decisions on the
preemption doctrine which involve medical device claims: Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr,76 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal Committee,77 and
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.78 Due in large part to the last two decisions
mentioned, preemption has become a major defense in the field of
medical devices.79 However, these decisions have also created a
narrow gap, known as the parallel claim exception, through which
state law claims can fit to avoid preemption.80

69. See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis:
Preemption of Medical Device “Parallel Claims”, 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 159,
163 (2013).
70. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 241–42 (1947); see also
Eggen, supra note 69, at 163–64.
71. Eggen, supra note 69, at 164.
72. Id.
73. “[T]he Court has found pre-emption where compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce.”
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 589 (2009); see also Eggen, supra note 69, at 164.
74. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 589 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
75. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 321–22 (2008) (undertaking an
express preemption analysis); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341,
348 (2001) (undertaking an implied conflict/ obstacle preemption analysis); see also
Eggen, supra note 69, at 167.
76. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
77. 531 U.S. 341.
78. 552 U.S. 312.
79. Prince, supra note 34, at 1038.
80. See generally, Eggen, supra note 69, at 160–61.
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The Supreme Court’s Express Preemption Doctrine
a.

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr

The Supreme Court first addressed the scope of the MDA’s
preemption provision in Lohr.81 The Supreme Court, applying a
presumption against preemption, ruled that Lohr’s common law
claims against a device approved through § 510(k) are not
preempted.82 The presumption against preemption is used in a field
traditionally occupied by the states.83 In such a field, the Court
“start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”84
In Lohr, Medtronic manufactured a Model 4011 pacemaker that
was approved by the FDA through the expedited § 510(k) process
requiring “substantial equivalence” to an already approved device.85
In 1990, Lora Lohr’s Model 4011 pacemaker failed, allegedly due to a
defective lead.86
Lohr and her husband sued under theories of negligence and strict
liability.87 The Court held that the Lohrs’ claims were not preempted
because § 510(k) approval did not amount to a federal requirement.88
According to the Court, the § 510(k) process did not impose a federal
requirement because the FDA had only made a determination of
“substantial equivalence,” not a determination of “safety and
effectiveness.”89 “[S]ubstantial equivalence determinations provide
little protection to the public. These determinations simply compare
a post–1976 device to a pre–1976 device to ascertain whether the later
device is no more dangerous and no less effective than the earlier
device.”90
Medtronic argued that the Lohrs’ claims should be preempted
because it complied with Current Good Manufacturing Practices
(CGMPs), which impose generalized duties on all manufacturers of
81. Elliot Sheppard Tarloff, Medical Devices and Preemption: A Defense of
Parallel Claims Based on Violations of Non-Device Specific FDA Regulations, 86
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1196, 1203 (2011).
82. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 494 (1996).
83. Id. at 485.
84. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
85. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 480–81.
86. Id. at 481.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 502; see also Eggen, supra note 69, at 167.
89. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 493.
90. Id.

2014]

PARALLEL CLAIM EXCEPTION

303

medical devices.91 The Court rejected Medtronic’s argument and held
that the generalized duties imposed by the CGMP are not specific
enough to preempt the Lohrs’ common law claims.92 Therefore, the
Lohrs’ state law claims regarding a device that went through § 510(k)
were not preempted because there was no conflict with the FDA’s
rules relating to manufacturing and labeling.93

b.

Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.

Twelve years later, the Supreme Court ruled that claims regarding
medical devices that went through the full PMA have a preemptive
effect. During a coronary angioplasty in 1996, Medtronic’s Evergreen
Balloon Catheter was inserted into Charles Riegel’s artery to inflate
the artery like a balloon in hopes of dilating it.94 On the fifth
inflation, the catheter burst, and as a result, Riegel suffered severe
and permanent injuries.95 Charles and his wife Donna sued in the
Northern District of New York seeking compensatory damages.96
They alleged that the catheter inserted into Riegel was designed,
labeled, and manufactured in violation of New York common law.97
In Riegel, the Supreme Court expressly preempted plaintiffs’
common law claims involving an Evergreen Balloon Catheter, which
went through the full PMA process.98
In reaching the conclusion that the Riegels’ state law claims were
expressly preempted, the Court undertook a two step analysis.99

91. Id. at 497–98. The CGMPs “govern the methods . . . for, the design,
manufacture, packaging, labeling, storage, installation, and servicing of all finished
devices.” 21 C.F.R. § 820.1 (2014). The CGMPs were “established to be flexible in
order to allow each manufacturer to decide individually how to best implement the
necessary controls.” Facts About Current Good Manufacturing Practices (CGMPs),
US FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/
manufacturing/ucm169105.htm (last updated Oct. 24, 2014).
92. The generality of the CGMPs “make this quite unlike a case in which the
Federal Government has weighed the competing interests.” CGMPs “reflect
important but entirely generic concerns about device regulation generally, not the
sort of concerns regarding a specific device or field of device regulation that the
statute or regulations were designed to protect from potentially contradictory state
requirements.” Lohr, 518 U.S. at 501.
93. See id. at 501.
94. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 320 (2008); Prince, supra note 34, at
1044.
95. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 320.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 592 F. Supp.
2d 1147, 1151 (D. Minn. 2009), aff’d, 623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010).
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First, the Court had to determine whether the PMA imposed
“requirements” of “safety and effectiveness” under the MDA. The
Court held that PMA approval does impose “requirements” because,
as the rigorous PMA process indicates, the FDA will only approve of
a device if it “offers a reasonable assurance of safety and
effectiveness.”100 Second, the Court had to decide whether plaintiffs’
common law claims imposed requirements that were “different from
or in addition to” the PMA requirements imposed under § 360k(a).
The Court held that common law claims constitute “requirements”
because the legal duty is imposed and the common law damages
remedy is “a potent method of governing conduct and controlling
policy.”101 The Court then concluded that the state law common law
requirements are “different from or in addition to” those imposed by
federal law.102 This is because a jury could weigh the risks and
benefits of a device in a way that conflicts with the FDA decision
made during PMA that the device was safe and effective.103 For these
reasons, the Riegels’ state law claims were expressly preempted by §
360k.

2.

The Parallel Claim Exception Carved Out in Riegel and Lohr

Riegel effectively precluded many common law tort law claims.
However, the Riegel court made clear that it was only preempting
common law claims in which the manufacturer “violated state law tort
duties notwithstanding compliance with the relevant federal
requirements.”104 The Supreme Court recognized in both Riegel and
Lohr that claims premised on a violation of a federal requirement
could survive preemption.105 In Lohr, the Court said “nothing in §
360k denies [the state] the right to provide a traditional damages
remedy for violations of common-law duties when those duties
parallel federal requirements.”106 The Riegel Court reaffirmed this
view when it said: “Section 360k does not prevent a State from
providing a damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of
FDA regulations; the state duties in such a case ‘parallel,’ rather than

100. Riegel, 522 U.S. at 323. “Premarket approval . . . imposes ‘requirements’
under the MDA.” Id. at 322.
101. Id. at 324 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992)).
102. Id. at 330.
103. Id. at 325.
104. Id. at 330 (emphasis added); Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 552 (7th
Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
105. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996).
106. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495.
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add to, federal requirements.”107 Hence, parallel claims—that is, state
law claims premised on a violation of federal law—are not expressly
preempted because such claims are not in conflict with federal
requirements.108
In a more recent decision involving generic drugs, the Supreme
Court also seemed to leave the door open for parallel claims. In
Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, the Court held that plaintiff’s
design defect claim involving a generic drug was impliedly preempted
due to the impossibility of complying with both state and federal
law.109 The Court found that plaintiff’s claim, which was premised on
the theory that the manufacturer should have changed its labeling,
conflicted with FDCA regulations prohibiting a generic drug
manufacturer from unilaterally changing its labels.110 However, the
Court did note that it was “not address[ing] state design-defect claims
that parallel the federal misbranding statute.”111 One claim that could
fall within the parallel claim exception would be if the generic drug
manufacturer violated the federal misbranding statute by failing to
pull a dangerous drug from the market.112
B.

Implied Preemption

Although a claim that falls within the parallel claim exception
survives express preemption, such a claim may still be impliedly
preempted.113 In 2001, the Supreme Court held in Buckman that
plaintiff’s claims survived express preemption but failed to escape
implied preemption.114 In Buckman, the Court looked beyond the
text and used an implied conflict preemption analysis.115 Specifically,
the Buckman court undertook an obstacle preemption analysis.116

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330.
See generally id. at 312; see also Eggen, supra note 69, at 167.
133 S. Ct. 2466, 2477.

Id. at 2473.
Id. at 2477 n.4.
See id.; see also Brian Wolfman & Anne King, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v.
Bartlett and Its Implications, U.S. L. WK., Nov. 5, 2013, at 1, 8, available at
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2306&context=fac
pub.
113. “Thus, although [Riegel v.] Medtronic can be read to allow certain state-law
causes of actions that parallel federal safety requirements, it does not and cannot
stand for the proposition that any violation of the FDCA will support a state-law
claim.” Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353 (2001).
114. See id. at 347–48.
115. Eggen, supra note 69, at 168 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).
116. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350.
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In Buckman, the FDA twice denied the manufacturer’s § 510(k)
application for use of a bone screw in spinal surgery.117 The
manufacturer submitted a third application seeking approval for the
bone screws for use in the long bones of the arms and legs.118 A
regulatory consultant of the manufacturer represented to the FDA
that the bone screws would only be used in long bone surgery.119
Thousands of plaintiffs sued the regulatory consultant alleging that
the consultant, Buckman, made fraudulent representations to the
FDA as to the intended use of the bone screws.120
The Court treated the claims as within the parallel claim exception
because “‘fraud on the FDA’ constitutes a violation of both federal
and state law.”121 Nonetheless, the Court held that plaintiffs’ claims
were impliedly preempted.122 As a threshold matter, the Court
refused to apply the presumption against preemption because
“policing fraud against federal agencies is hardly ‘a field which the
States have traditionally occupied.’”123 The Court then held that the
FDA has exclusive authority to enforce claims of fraud. It construed
21 U.S.C. § 337, which provides that enforcement of FDCA violations
“shall be by and in the name of the United States,” as barring private
action of plaintiff’s claims. The Court also explained that the § 510(k)
approval process created a “comprehensive scheme for determining
whether an applicant has demonstrated that a product is substantially
equivalent to a predicate device”124 First, the manufacturer must
comply with FDA disclosure requirements such as submitting labeling
and advertisements to the FDA.125 Secondly, according to the Court,
the FDA is given ample enforcement power to deter or punish fraud,
including: the power to investigate fraud, seek injunctive relief and
civil penalties, seize the device, and pursue criminal sanctions.126
After determining that the FDA has ample authority to police
fraud, the Court concluded that the “state law fraud-on-the-FDA
claims inevitability conflict with the FDA’s responsibility to police

117. Id. at 346.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 346–47.
121. Id. at 348; Eggen, supra note 69, at 169.
122. “[T]here is clear evidence here that Congress intended that the MDA be
enforced exclusively by the Federal Government.” Buckman, 531 U.S. at 342.
123. Id. at 347 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
124. Id. at 348.
125. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 807.87(e)–(f) (2014)).
126. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 349; see 21 U.S.C. §§ 332, 333(a), 333(f)(1)(A),
334(a)(2)(D), 372 (2012).
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fraud.”127 The court gave several public policy reasons why there
would be an inevitable conflict. First, complying with the FDA’s
detailed regulatory scheme and the tort regimes of fifty states would
be dramatically burdensome for the manufacturer.128
Second,
manufacturers may be deterred from applying for § 510(k) approval
out of fear that they will be “exposed to unpredictable civil
liability.”129 Third, applicants worried that their disclosures will not
be sufficient in state court, may submit a deluge of unnecessary
information to the FDA, which would delay the “comparatively
speedy § 510(k) process.”130 Delays in § 510(k) approval would, in
turn, impede competition among devices and delay the prescription of
beneficial off-label uses.131
The question left open after Buckman is to what extent common
law claims that parallel federal law are impliedly preempted.132 The
Buckman court stated that some, but not all, parallel claims are
impliedly preempted when it said, “although Medtronic [v. Lohr] can
be read to allow certain state-law causes of actions that parallel
federal safety requirements, it does not and cannot stand for the
proposition that any violation of the FDCA will support a state-law
claim.”133 According to the Buckman court, the difference between
Lohr, in which the claims were not preempted, and Buckman, in
which they were preempted, was the source of the cause of action.134
In Lohr, the claim was based on traditional state law for failure to use
reasonable care, whereas in Buckman, the Court found that the
causes of action “exist solely by virtue of the FDCA disclosure
requirements.”135
C.

The Narrow Gap

Together, Riegel, Lohr, and Buckman, “create a narrow gap
through which a plaintiff’s state-law claim must fit through to escape
express or implied preemption.”136 The claim must allege a violation
of a federal requirement to avoid express preemption under Riegel,

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 351.
Id.
See Eggen, supra note 69, at 173; see also Prince, supra note 34, at 1071.
Buckman, 531 U.S. at 353.
Prince, supra note 34, at 1071.
Buckman, 531 U.S. at 353.
Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (D. Minn. 2009).
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but even if it does, it must then avoid the ambit of Buckman’s implied
preemption doctrine.137 However, the Supreme Court did not
provide much guidance on what exactly fits through the narrow gap
that they created through this triad of cases.138 The result is that
lower courts have not treated the narrow gap with consistency or
uniformity.139
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that judges often base their
preemption decision off of extralegal factors such as their ideology,
the court they sit on, and the residence of the litigants.140 According
to Professor Jean Eggen, courts have merged the distinct doctrines of
express and implied preemption into a “unitary standard,” such that it
is now a matter of “policy and discretion,” which standard courts
choose to preempt plaintiff’s claim.141 Supreme Court Justices
Kennedy and Thomas have acknowledged that the preemption
doctrine can result in a “freewheeling” judicial inquiry.142
Consequently, there is no uniform judicial inquiry of the preemption
doctrine amongst the lower courts.
II. DIVERGING DOCTRINE IN THE WAKE OF RIEGEL
A. Genuine Equivalency
In the wake of Riegel, lower courts have differed on exactly which
claims fit through this narrow gap to survive preemption. A threshold
issue is what exactly constitutes a parallel claim. As established in
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC and McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., to

137. 27 MINN. PRAC., PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 9.11.50 (2014).
138. The Eighth Circuit has said that “[t]he contours of the parallel claim exception
were not addressed in Riegel and are as-yet ill-defined.” In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint
Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 2010).
139. Eggen, supra note 69, at 172.
140. According to a study conducted by Samuel Raymond, a New York University
J.D. candidate, “litigants are better off when the case is decided in the state where
they reside or have an office. When the plaintiff sues in a different state than their
residence, they won just a single time. Plaintiffs won 27.2% of the cases where they
sued in their home state court.” Samuel Raymond, Note, Judicial Politics and
Medical Device Preemption After Riegel, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 745, 765 (2010).
In addition, Raymond’s data shows “that Democratic-appointed judges [are] more
than 3 times as likely to find ‘no preemption’ as Republican-appointed judges.” Id.
141. Eggen, supra note 69, at 171–72; see also Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The Mature

Product Preemption Doctrine: The Unitary Standard and the Paradox of Consumer
Protection, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 95, 115, 133 (2009).
142. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 604 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 459 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n,
505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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fit within the parallel claim exception and thus avoid express
preemption, plaintiff must show that the state and federal
requirements are “genuinely equivalent.”143 This means that a state
law claim must be premised on a duty that is the same as the duty
imposed by the FDCA.144
For instance, in Bates the Supreme Court held that “a state-law
labeling requirement must in fact be equivalent to a requirement
under FIFRA [the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act] in order to survive pre-emption.”145 In Bates, Dow allegedly
recommended the use of its pesticide in all soils even though Dow
knew or should have known that the pesticide would stunt the growth
of peanuts in soils with pH levels greater than 7.0.146 Texas peanut
farmers brought fraud and failure-to-warn claims against Dow.147 The
farmers’ fraud and failure-to-warn claims were parallel claims
because they were premised on violations of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) misbranding provisions.148
The Court held that the common law duties plaintiff sought to impose
were equivalent to the FIFRA’s requirements that a pesticide label
not contain false or misleading statements or inadequate warnings.
Although Bates involved FIFRA, the Court found that this “parallel
requirements” reading of the statute “finds strong support in
Medtronic v. Lohr.”149
Although there is no Supreme Court case establishing the genuine
equivalency standard for medical devices, the Seventh Circuit has
applied Bates to the medical device context, and other circuits have
followed suit.150 In McMullen, the Seventh Circuit held that:
[I]n order for a state requirement to be parallel to a federal
requirement . . . the plaintiff must show that the requirements are
‘genuinely equivalent.’ State and federal requirements are not

143. McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 2005).
144. Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 776 (D. Minn. 2009); Prince, supra
note 34, at 1051.
145. 544 U.S. at 453.
146. Id. at 434–35.
147. Id. at 446.
148. See id. at 446–48. FIFRA’s misbranding provisions require that a pesticide
label not contain false or misleading statements or inadequate instructions or
warning. Id. at 447 (citing 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(q)(1)(A); (q)(1)(F)(G)).
149. Id. at 432.
150. McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 2005); see also
Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 634 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2011).
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genuinely equivalent if a manufacturer could be held liable under
the state law without having violated the federal law.151

In other words, a state requirement is “different from or in
addition to” when it is not genuinely equivalent to a federal
requirement.152
In contrast to Bates, the McMullen court held that the
manufacturer’s alleged violation of a state requirement was not
genuinely equivalent to the federal requirement allegedly violated.153
Jack McMullen had two Medtronic Activa devices implanted in his
brain to suppress tremors caused by his Parkinson’s disease.154 In
March 2001, McMullen underwent dental surgery that involved use of
diathermy.155 As a result of the diathermy, McMullen suffered severe
brain damage. In January 2001, Medtronic knew of an anecdotal
report where the use of diathermy on a person with an implanted
Activa allegedly caused brain damage.156 However, Medtronic did
not strengthen its warning until May 2001.157 McMullen and his wife
brought a state law failure-to-warn claim, alleging that Medtronic
violated its state and federal duty by failing to strengthen its warning
between January and March 2001.158
The Seventh Circuit held that the McMullens’ state law claim was
not genuinely equivalent to any FDCA violation and thus was
expressly preempted.159 Under the FDCA, a manufacturer must
obtain FDA approval to change warnings of an approved device but
can temporarily amend its warnings pending FDA approval of the
proposed changes.160 The court understood these FDA regulations as
allowing but not requiring the manufacturer to change its warnings

151. McMullen, 421 F.3d at 489 (citation omitted).
152. When “there are both state and federal requirements to this [same] effect,
then the state requirements will not be different from, or in addition to, the federal
requirements.” Id. at 488.
153. Id. at 490.
154. Id. at 484.
155. Id. at 485.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 485–86.
158. Id. at 486. Plaintiffs argue McMullen violated two federal regulations. “21
C.F.R. § 821.1, which requires manufacturers to track recipients of devices; and §
814.39, which permits manufacturers to enhance warnings pending approval of a
proposed change to an earlier-approved warning.” Id. at 488–89.
159. Id. at 489. “Where a federal requirement permits a course of conduct and the
state makes it obligatory, the state’s requirement is in addition to federal requirement
and thus is preempted.”
160. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 814.39 (2014).
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upon learning of adverse events.161 In contrast to the FDCA, the
state law duty would require the manufacturer to provide an
additional warning between January and March 2001.162 Thus the
court held that plaintiff’s state law claim was expressly preempted
because it was not genuinely equivalent to the FDCA violations
alleged.163
B.

General or Device-Specific Requirement

Once it is established that the manufacturer violated a genuinely
equivalent federal requirement, the question then becomes how
specific that federal requirement must be. Whether the plaintiff must
plead a violation of a generally applicable requirement or whether
that federal requirement must be specific to the particular device in
question has led to a split amongst the circuits.164 The Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have held that a common law claim
premised on a generally applicable requirement or industry-wide
regulation survives preemption. In contrast, the Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits have expressly preempted claims premised on an industrywide regulation, and have instead demanded that the requirement be
specific to the device in question.
Device-specific requirements are requirements set forth in the premarket approval files.165 For example, a device-specific requirement
could be a manufacturer’s representation in its PMA that each hip
implant component be sterilized at a temperature of 800 degrees.166
A federal requirement may also be more general, applying to the
medical device industry as a whole. An example of such a generally
applicable requirement is the Current Good Manufacturing Practices
(CGMPs) set forth in the Quality System Regulation (QSR).167 The
CGMPs “govern the methods used in . . . the design, manufacture,
packaging, labeling, storage, installation, and servicing of all finished

161. McMullen, 421 F.3d at 489.
162. Id. at 490.
163. Id. at 489–90.
164. Prince, supra note 34, at 1054.
165. In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200,
1206–07 (8th Cir. 2010).
166. Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 513 (5th Cir. 2012).
167. Prince, supra note 34, at 1054–55; see also Quality System (QS)
Regulation/Medical Device Good Manufacturing Practices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://
www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/
postmarketrequirements/qualitysystemsregulations (last updated June 30, 2014).
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devices.”168 The CGMPs were “established to be flexible in order to
allow each manufacturer to decide individually how to best
implement the necessary controls.”169
Another example of a
generally applicable requirement is the Medical Device Reporting
requirements (MDRs), which require manufacturers to report to the
FDA when they become aware of information that reasonably
suggests that their device may have caused serious injuries or
malfunctions.170
How specific the requirement must be to survive preemption is so
bound up with issues of pleading that it is hard to separate the two.171
Plaintiffs are now held to a heightened pleading standard due to the
Supreme Court decisions of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.172 Prior to Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff was held
to a notice pleading standard, where his claims would not be
dismissed under 12(b)(6) unless the plaintiff could “prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”173
However, in Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court re-interpreted
the pleading requirements of Rule 8 to require that the claim be
“plausible on its face.”174 These decisions raised the pleading
standard from “possible” to “plausible.”175 Plaintiffs can no longer
rely on “labels and conclusions” or “formalistic recitations” to survive
a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, but, rather, they must plead some facts
that support their allegation.176 Courts have relied on Twombly and
Iqbal, in addition to Riegel, to dismiss parallel claims against medical
devices.177

168. 21 C.F.R. § 820.1 (2014); see also Facts About Current Good Manufacturing
Practices (CGMPs), supra note 91.
169. Facts About Current Good Manufacturing Practices (CGMPs), supra note 91.
170. 21 C.F.R. § 803.50(a) (2014).
171. Eggen, supra note 69, at 174.
172. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 545 (2007).
173. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
174. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547
(discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8).
175. “[S]omething beyond the mere possibility of [a federal violation] must be
alleged, lest a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim be allowed to take up the time
of a number of other people.” Daniel W. Whitney, Guide to Preemption of StateLaw Claims Against Class III PMA Medical Devices, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 113, 124
(2010) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S at 557–58).
176. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.
177. Whitney, supra note 175, at 125.
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Courts are divided on how specific a plaintiff must be in pleading
claims against a Class III medical device manufacturer. The Eighth
and Eleventh Circuits have held that only federal requirements that
are specific to the device in question survive dismissal. In In re

Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Product Liability Litigation
(Sprint Fidelis), plaintiffs in a multidistrict litigation action alleged
that leads, small wires connecting implantable cardiac defibrillators,
were prone to fracture, causing patients to suffer unnecessary
shocks.178 The FDA ultimately issued a Class I recall of the leads, but
at the time of the recall, over 150,000 leads were still implanted in
patients.179 Plaintiffs brought a manufacturing defect claim asserting
that the welding technique used to affix the leads violated 21 U.S.C. §
351.180 Section 351 states that a product is adulterated if not in
conformity with the CGMPs.181
The District Court of Minnesota concluded that the “general
allegations of failure to comply with the CGMPs . . . do not save these
claims from preemption under § 360k because plaintiffs failed to
identify any specific requirement in the PMA approval.”182 Given
“[t]he flexibility inherent in the CGMPs and QSR,” plaintiff’s state
law claim would impose requirements that are “different from, or in
addition to” the CGMPs/QSR.183 According to the court, plaintiff
“cannot simply incant the magic words ‘[the defendant] violated FDA
regulations’ to avoid preemption.”184
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district court’s application
of Twombly held them to an impossible pleading standard because
specific requirements in PMA approval are not accessible without
discovery.185 The Eighth Circuit rejected plaintiff’s argument and
affirmed the district court, holding that the plaintiff “simply failed to

178. In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200,
1203 (8th Cir. 2010).
179. There is some dispute as to the number of leads that remain implanted in
patients after the recall. Tolley estimates that 150,000 leads remain implanted,
whereas the plaintiffs in the Sprint Fidelis Litigation allege that 257,000 leads remain
implanted. Compare TOLLEY supra note 6, at 4, with In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint
Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1154 (D. Minn. 2009), aff’d,
623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010), and Prince, supra note 34, at 1055.
180. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d at 1206.
181. 21 U.S.C. § 351(h)(1) (2012).
182. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d at 1206.
183. In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 592 F. Supp. 2d
at 1158, aff’d, 623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010).
184. Id.
185. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d at 1206.
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adequately plead that Medtronic violated a federal requirement
specific to the FDA’s PMA approval of this Class III device.”186
The Eleventh Circuit has aligned with the Eighth Circuit’s position
that the plaintiff must allege a device-specific requirement in the
PMA. In Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow International, Inc, an Arrow
pump system was implanted into Linda Wolicki-Gables’ back to
deliver pain medication.187 The connector of the pump was allegedly
defective, resulting in Linda’s partial paraplegia.188 Linda and her
husband brought manufacturing defect, design defect, and failure-towarn claims premised on Arrow’s failure to manufacture, design, and
provide adequate warnings of the pump system in accordance with
FDCA regulations.189 The plaintiffs further contended that because
the manufacturer destroyed the connector, they were entitled to a
presumption that the connector was not manufactured in accordance
with FDA regulations.190 The Eleventh Circuit held that “to properly
allege parallel claims, the complaint must set forth facts pointing to
specific PMA requirements that have been violated.”191 The court
found that the complaint did not “set forth any specific problem, or
failure to comply with any FDA regulation that can be linked to the
injury alleged.”192 According to the court, plaintiffs failed to properly
allege parallel claims and therefore the claims were preempted.193
Some district courts have issued similar rulings to those given by
the Eleventh and Eighth Circuits. For instance, the Eastern District
of New York took a stance akin to these Circuits in Horowitz v.
Stryker and Illaraza v. Medtronic, Inc. In Horowitz v. Stryker,
Stryker recalled some of its Trident hip implant systems due to
dimensional anomalies of some of its component parts from 2006 to
2007.194 In 2007, upon inspection of Stryker’s manufacturing facilities,
the FDA issued two warning letters stating that the Trident System
was adulterated within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 351 because it

186. Id.
187. 634 F.3d 1296, 1297 (11th Cir. 2011).
188. Id. at 1298–99.
189. Id. at 1300.
190. Id.
191. Id. (quoting Parker v. Stryker Corp., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1301 (D. Colo.
2008)
192. Id. at 1302 (quoting Ilarraza v. Medtronic, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 582, 589
(E.D.N.Y. 2009)).
193. See id. at 1303.
194. Plaintiff admitted that neither the Trident System nor the component parts
implanted in her were included in any of the recalls. Horowitz v. Stryker Corp., 613 F.
Supp. 2d 271, 275 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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failed to comply with the CGMPs.195
Plaintiff brought a
manufacturing defect claim against Stryker premised on violations of
the CGMPs.196
The Eastern District held that “reliance on
[defendants’ violations of] CGMPs and QSR . . . does not save these
claims from preemption . . . [as such requirements] are simply too
generic, standing alone, to serve as the basis for [her] manufacturingdefect claim[ ].”197 In Ilarraza v. Medtronic, Inc., the plaintiff brought
a manufacturing defect claim against Medtronic alleging that
Medtronic’s pump and catheter, which fractured inside the plaintiff,
violated the GGMPs.198 The Eastern District held that CGMPs were
left “intentionally vague and open-ended” so that the manufacturer
can tailor the regulations to the safety and efficacy needs of their
particular device.199 Therefore:
[s]ince these regulations are open to a particular manufacturer’s
interpretation, allowing them to serve as a basis for a claim would
lead to differing safety requirements that might emanate from
various lawsuits. This would necessarily result in the imposition of
standards that are “different from, or in addition to” those imposed
by the MDA—precisely the result that the MDA preemption
provision seeks to prevent.200

The court in Illarraza similarly found plaintiff’s claims failed to
withstand the pleading requirements of Twombly because plaintiff
had “done nothing more tha[n] recite unsupported violations of

195. Id. at 276. The FDA defines a warning letter as:
[A] correspondence that notifies regulated industry about violations that
FDA has documented during its inspections or investigations. Typically, a
Warning Letter notifies a responsible individual or firm that the Agency
considers one or more products, practices, processes, or other activities to
be in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act), its
implementing regulations and other federal statutes. Warning Letters
should only be issued for violations of regulatory significance, i.e., those that
may actually lead to an enforcement action if the documented violations are
not promptly and adequately corrected. A Warning Letter is one of the
Agency’s principal means of achieving prompt voluntary compliance with
the Act.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, EXHIBIT 4-1:
PROCEDURES FOR CLEARING FDA WARNING LETTERS AND UNTITLED LETTERS
(2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/
RegulatoryProceduresManual/UCM176965.pdf.
196. Horowitz, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 276.
197. Id. at 284 (citing In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig.,
592 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1151 (D. Minn. 2009), aff’d, 623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010)).
198. See 677 F. Supp. 2d 582, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
199. See id. at 588.
200. Id.
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general regulations, and fail[ed] to tie such allegations to the injuries
alleged.”201
In all of the above-mentioned cases, the circuits or district courts
seemed to take the view that plaintiff’s parallel claim must allege a
violation of a specific requirement in the PMA to withstand Riegel
and Twombly. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits,
however, have held that the plaintiff need not allege a device-specific
requirement.202 In the opinions of those Circuits, alleging that the
manufacturer violated a generally applicable federal requirement is
adequate at the pleading stage.203
In Bausch v. Stryker Corp., the Seventh Circuit was faced with
parallel claims against the same implant system as in Horowitz, and
yet it held that the claims survived dismissal. Stryker’s Trident hip
implant system was implanted in plaintiff’s body six days after the
FDA issued a warning letter to Stryker stating that a component in
the system was adulterated.204 Plaintiff alleged that the “Trident
Acetabular Hip Systems were adulterated due to manufacturing
methods that were not in conformity with industry and regulatory
standards.”205 Stryker argued that plaintiff must allege a violation of
a concrete, device-specific regulation, and thus plaintiff’s claims,
premised on violations of the QSR and CGMPs, were too general to
allow juries to enforce them. 206 The Seventh Circuit said “we do not
see a sound legal basis for defendants’ proposal to distinguish
between general requirements and ‘concrete, device-specific’
requirements.”207 The court gave several reasons to support this
conclusion. First, the distinction between general and specific
requirements has no basis in the preemption provision of § 360(k).208
Second, it is difficult for a plaintiff to plead a device-specific
requirement because most of the PMA specifications are not
accessible without discovery.209 Third, a general/specific distinction
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., Prince, supra note 34, at 1060.
203. See id at 1060.
204. Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 2010).
205. Bausch v. Stryker Corp., No. 108CV04248, 2008 WL 4227478 (N.D. Ill. July
25, 2008).
206. Bausch, 630 F.3d at 554.
207. Id. at 555.
208. Id. at 556.
209. For plaintiff to plead a specific defect in the Trident that violated the FDA,
“she would need access to the confidential materials in the premarket approval
application setting forth the medical device’s specifications. This is simply not
possible without discovery.” Id. at 560 (emphasis added); see also Ashley Abraham
Williams, Surviving Medical Device Preemption Under 21 U.S.C. 360k: Clarifying
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would “leave injured patients without any remedy for a wide range of
harmful violations of federal law.”210 Hence, the Bausch court,
inapposite to the Horowitz court, found that a plaintiff’s claim should
not be dismissed solely because it was based on a generally applicable
requirement like the CGMPs.211
The Sixth Circuit in Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics Inc. also held
that a violation of a CGMP should withstand dismissal.212 In Howard,
Sulzer allegedly used a manufacturing process that left lubricating
machine oil on its knee implants, and as a result thousands of
patients’ implants failed to bond with the bone.213 Sulzer discovered
the problem and voluntarily recalled 40,000 implants.214 In a multidistrict litigation proceeding, plaintiffs asserted a negligence per se
theory under Ohio law.215 The Howard court, contrary to the holding
in Sprint Fidelis, where plaintiff did not identify a specific CGMP that
was violated, cited a particular CGMP that “is not so vague as to be
incapable of enforcement.”216 In particular, the CGMP provided that
“where manufacturing material is reasonably expected to have an
adverse effect on product quality, the manufacturer shall establish
and maintain procedures . . . to ensure that it is removed or limited to
an amount that does not adversely affect the device’s quality.”217 The
violation of this CGMP, which can be read as requiring Sulzer to
remove the oil that the manufacturing process left behind, was
sufficient to survive preemption.218
Similarly, in Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp., the Fifth Circuit
held that violations of the MDR, an industry-wide regulation like the
CGMPs, withstood dismissal.219
In Hughes, Boston Scientific
manufactured a device that treated excess uterine bleeding by
circulating hot saline solution into the uterus.220 Hot liquid leaked
from plaintiff’s device, allegedly causing the plaintiff to suffer a

Pleading Standards for Parallel Claims in the Wake of Twombly and Iqbal, 9 SETON
HALL CIRCUIT REV. 109, 121 (2013).
210. Bausch, 630 F.3d at 555.
211. Id.
212. 382 F. App’x 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2010).
213. Id. at 438.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 820.70(h) (2014).
218. Howard, 382 F. App’x at 440.
219. 631 F.3d 762, 769 (5th Cir. 2011).
220. Id. at 764.
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second-degree burn.221 Boston Scientific developed an algorithm for
reporting burn injuries, where first-degree burns were never reported
to the FDA and some, but not all, second-degree burns were
reported.222 Upon learning of these reporting practices, the FDA sent
a warning letter to Boston Scientific to abandon the algorithm and
begin reporting more burns.223 The plaintiff alleged that Boston
Scientific, by failing to report these burns, violated the MDR, which
requires manufacturers to report serious injuries and malfunctions to
the FDA.224 The Fifth Circuit denied Boston Scientific’s motion for
summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff’s state-law failure-towarn claim premised on MDR violations was not preempted.225 The
court stated “[a] factfinder could infer that a manufacturer’s failure to
provide this information as required by FDA regulations is a parallel
violation of the state duty to provide reasonable and adequate
information about a device’s risks.”226
About a year later, in Bass v. Stryker Corp., the Fifth Circuit
adhered to its decision in Hughes and held plaintiff’s allegation of a
generally applicable requirement avoids preemption.227 Bass involved
claims alleging that Stryker’s Trident system was adulterated in
violation of the CGMPs.228 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that
excessive manufacturing residuals in the Shell component prevented
bony ingrowth, which resulted in a loose shell, thereby causing pain in
the plaintiff’s hip.229 The Court held that:
[T]he key distinction between complaints that withstand a motion to
dismiss and those that do not is not reliance on the CGMPs but
rather . . . a manufacturing defect caused by a violation of federal
regulations and allegations connecting a defect in the manufacture
of the specific device to that plaintiff’s specific injury.230

The court in Bass found that plaintiff’s claim pleaded sufficient
facts including: warning letters issued by the FDA, a voluntary recall
by Stryker, and an injury consistent with excessive residuals.
Therefore the court held that the complaint met Twombly’s
221. Id. at 765.
222. Id. at 766.
223. Id. at 767.
224. See id. at 766; see also 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a)(1) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 803.50(a)
(2014).
225. See Hughes, 631 F.3d at 769.
226. Id. at 771.
227. See 669 F.3d 501, 515 (5th Cir. 2012)
228. See id. at 510.
229. See id.
230. Id. at 511–12.
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plausibility standard because it “specifie[d] with particularity what
went wrong in the manufacturing process and cite[d] the relevant
FDA manufacturing standards Stryker allegedly violated.”231 The
Bass court rejected Stryker’s argument that plaintiff’s claim should be
expressly preempted because it was too vague to be enforced by a
jury. The court reasoned that by the time the case was tried, the jury
would have before it the PMA application that was approved by the
FDA.232
The Ninth Circuit has taken the Fifth Circuit’s position that a
violation of the generally applicable MDRs survives dismissal. In
Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., for instance, the Ninth Circuit held that the
plaintiff’s claim alleging that Medtronic failed to report adverse
events in violation of the MDR survives dismissal.233 In Coleman v.
Medtronic Inc., the California Court of Appeals followed the analysis
of Stengel.234
In Coleman, plaintiff suffered painful complications after posterior
lumbar interbody fusion surgery, a form of spinal surgery, allegedly
because Infuse, a device designed to strengthen the spine of
individuals with degenerated vertebral discs, was used during the
procedure.235 The FDA had only approved Infuse for anterior fusion
surgery, and thus using Infuse during posterior fusion surgery was
considered an off-label use.236 The plaintiff brought a failure-to-warn
claim based on Medtronic’s failure to report adverse events
associated with Infuse in posterior fusion surgery.237 Medtronic
reported to the FDA that there were no adverse events, but according
to the plaintiff there were adverse events in twenty to seventy percent
of posterior fusion cases where Infuse was employed.238 The court
held that the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim, which relied upon
industry-wide violations of the MDR, withstood dismissal.239 The
plaintiff also asserted a manufacturing defect claim alleging that the

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 510.
Id. at 512.

704 F.3d 1224, 1233 (9th Cir. 2013).
223 Cal. App. 4th 413 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), review granted and opinion
superseded sub nom. Coleman v. Medtronics, 323 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2014).
236. Anterior Lumbar Interbody Fusion (Anterior Fusion), is a spinal fusion
surgery where a surgical incision is made in the patient’s abdomen, compared to
Posterior Lumbar Interbody Fusion (Posterior Fusion), where the incision is made in
the patient’s back. Id. at 304–06.
237. Id. at 314.
238. Id. at 305.
239. Id. at 311.
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plaintiff’s Infuse device was defective because it failed to comply with
the CGMPs.240 The California Court of Appeals held that pleading a
violation of CGMP is sufficient to withstand dismissal because
alleging a specific PMA requirement is not possible without
discovery.241

1.

Scope of Implied Preemption

Not only do lower courts disagree about the scope of express
preemption, but they also disagree about the scope of implied
preemption. The Supreme Court in Buckman drew a distinction
between the case at bar, where plaintiff’s claims were impliedly
preempted, and Lohr, where the plaintiff’s claims were not.242 In
Lohr, the plaintiffs’ claims survived preemption because they were
based on traditional state law theories of negligence.243 By contrast,
in Buckman, the plaintiffs’ “fraud claims exist[ed] solely by virtue of
the FDCA disclosure requirements.”244 It is clear from Buckman that
not all claims avoid implied preemption.245 What is less clear after
Buckman is exactly which claims, other than fraud-on-the-FDA
claims, if any, are impliedly preempted. The Sixth and Eighth
Circuits have adopted an expansive view of Buckman to impliedly
preempt traditional state law tort claims premised on FDA violations.
By contrast, the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have limited
Buckman’s scope to fraud-on-the-FDA claims, thereby allowing
traditional state law tort claims premised on FDA violations to avoid
implied preemption.
In Sprint Fidelis, the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s failureto-warn claim, alleging that Medtronic did not accurately and timely
submit adverse event reports in violation of the MDR, was impliedly
preempted.246 The Court construed Buckman to require that
“plaintiff must not be suing because the conduct violates the

240. Id. at 316.
241. Id. at 317.
242. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001).
243. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohrs, 518 U.S. 470, 500–02 (2010); See also Buckman, 531
U.S. 352–53.
244. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 353.
245. Id. (“Although Medtronic can be read to allow certain state-law causes of
actions that parallel federal safety requirements, it does not and cannot stand for the
proposition that any violation of the FDCA will support a state-law claim.”).
246. In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200,
1205 (8th Cir. 2010).

2014]

PARALLEL CLAIM EXCEPTION

321

FDCA.”247 The Court found that the claim that Medtronic did not
provide the FDA with sufficient information is “simply an attempt by
private parties to enforce the MDA claims foreclosed by § 337(a) as
construed in Buckman.”248
The Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Cupek v.
Medtronic, Inc., when it impliedly preempted plaintiff’s negligence
per se claim.249 In a negligence per se claim, the plaintiff relies on a
violation of a statute or regulation to establish duty and breach in
negligence.250 In Cupek, a pre-Riegel case, plaintiffs alleged a
negligence per se claim against Medtronic’s pacemaker leads based
on Medtronic’s failure to comply with the FDA’s conditions of
approval.251 The Sixth Circuit held that plaintiff’s claim was a
“disguised fraud on the FDA claim” and therefore was impliedly
preempted.252
Like the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, various district courts have
expanded Buckman beyond fraud-on-the FDA to impliedly preempt
traditional state law tort claims. In Lewkut v. Stryker Corp., the
Southern District of Texas applied Buckman expansively to preempt
Lewkut alleged that
Lewkut’s manufacturing defect claims.253
Stryker’s hip implant system was adulterated in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 351(h) of the FDCA.254 To the extent that Lewkut alleged a parallel
claim, the district court held that claim to be impliedly preempted
because 21 U.S.C. § 337 “explicitly precludes private enforcement of
federal laws regarding ‘adulterated’ devices.”255
Similarly, in Wheeler v. DePuy Spine, Inc., the Southern District of
Florida held that plaintiff’s negligence claim premised on violations of
the FDCA was impliedly preempted.256 In Wheeler, the plaintiff
suffered severe leg and back pain allegedly due to two implanted
artificial discs.257 Plaintiff argued that DePuy violated the MDR by
not accurately disclosing the number and extent of disc complications

247. Id. at 1204 (quoting Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (D. Minn.
2009)).
248. Id. at 1205.
249. 405 F.3d 421, 424 (6th Cir. 2005).
250. Eggen, supra note 69, at 189 (citing DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 134,
at 315 (2000)).
251. Cupek, 405 F.3d at 421.
252. Id. at 424.
253. 724 F. Supp. 2d 648, 660 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
254. Id. at 658; see also 21 U.S.C. § 351(h) (2012).
255. Lewkut, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 660.
256. 706 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
257. Id. at 1266.
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to the FDA.258 The court held that “[a]lthough Plaintiff states that he
is not bringing a fraud-on-the-FDA claim, the claim described by
Plaintiff appears to be such a claim, and as such it should be
addressed to the FDA.”259 As in Sprint Fidelis and Cupek, although
the plaintiffs in Lewkut and Wheeler asserted traditional state law
causes of action, both courts saw these claims as disguised fraud-onthe-FDA claims.
As in Wheeler and DePuy, in McClelland v. Medtronic, Inc. the
district court for the Middle District of Florida impliedly preempted
the plaintiff’s traditional state law tort claim.260 In McClelland,
Breanne McCelland allegedly died from a defect in Medtronic’s
EnPulse Model E1DR21 pacemaker.261 The plaintiff, decedent’s
mother, alleged that prior to decedent’s death, Medtronic became
aware that some of its pacemakers, including the E1DR21, were
defective. Specifically, Medtronic knew that the E1DR21 was likely
to “cause intense cardiac symptoms and fail[ure] to properly regulate
cardiac rhythm.”262 The plaintiff brought negligence per se and
failure-to-warn claims premised on Medtronic’s failure to accurately
and timely report E1DR21 incidents in violation of the FDCA. The
district court stated:
[T]he [MDA] provides that all actions to enforce the FDA
requirements “shall be by and in the name of the United
States[.]” . . . In Buckman, the United States Supreme Court
construed § 337(a) as impliedly preempting suits by private litigants
“for noncompliance with the medical device provisions.” In other
words, claims based upon FDCA disclosure requirements, rather
than traditional state tort law are impliedly preempted.263

The McClelland court seemed to interpret Buckman very liberally
to impliedly preempt all common law claims that are based on FDCA
Accordingly, both McClelland’s
disclosure requirements.264
negligence per se and failure-to-warn claims were impliedly
preempted.
The Middle District of Florida explained that McClelland’s failureto-warn claim was impliedly preempted because it was not based on
258. Id. at 1269–70; see also 21 C.F.R. § 814.3(1) (2014).
259. Wheeler, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 1270 n.4.
260. McClelland v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 6:11-CV-1444-ORL-36KRS, 2012 WL
5077401, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2012).
261. After McClelland’s death, Medtronic issued a Class II Recall of many
pacemakers including the E1DR21. Id. at *1.
262. Id.
263. Id. at *7 (internal citations omitted).
264. See id. at *5; see also Eggen, supra note 69, at 201.
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common law, but rather based on Defendant’s duty to warn pursuant
to the FDCA and FDA regulations.265 The court did note that the
plaintiff could have avoided implied preemption if she alleged that
Medtronic breached a duty to the decedent instead of to the FDA.266
However, such an allegation would nonetheless be fatal because it
would support express preemption.267 According to the court, a
failure-to-warn claim premised on a manufacturer’s duty to warn the
patient or the patient’s physician would be expressly preempted
because such a duty is not “genuinely equivalent” to any FDA
requirement.268 FDA regulations do not require manufacturers to
warn individual doctors about the safety and effectiveness of a
device.269 Thus, plaintiff’s claim “would hold [the defendant] liable
under state law without having violated an equivalent federal law”
and therefore would be expressly preempted, even if not impliedly
preempted.270
Another context in which district courts have expanded Buckman
involves claims based on an off-label promotion theory. In Riley v.
Cordis Corp., the District Court of Minnesota concluded that
plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim was impliedly preempted to the
extent that it was based on an off-label promotion theory.271 In Riley,
Cordis manufactured a Cypher stent, a drug-coated stent that is
implanted in a coronary artery to open up the artery and improve
blood flow.272 The plaintiff suffered a blood clot when the Cypher
stent was implanted through direct stenting.273 Direct stenting occurs
when the stent is implanted in an artery that has not previously been
predilated with a balloon catheter.274 Since the FDA did not approve
direct stenting of the Cypher stent, it constituted an off-label use.275
Plaintiff alleged that Cordis promoted the off-label use in a manner

265. McClelland, 2012 WL 5077401, at *5.
266. Id. at *7.
267. “To the extent Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is construed as alleging the
breach of a duty to the Decedent and not the breach of a duty to the FDA, the
principles outlined in Buckman are not implicated in this case. Though this fact is
ultimately fatal to Plaintiff’s claim, as it supports express preemption, it nonetheless
falls outside of the realm of implied preemption.” Id. at *7.
268. Id. at *6 see also infra Part II.A.
269. McClelland, 2012 WL 5077401, at *6.
270. Id.
271. 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 783 (D. Minn. 2009).
272. Id. at 774.
273. Id. at 775.
274. Id.
275. An “off-label” use is when a device is used for some other purpose than that
which the FDA approved. Id. at 778.
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that was not authorized by the FDCA.276 The court held the claim to
be “impliedly preempted” under Buckman, because “promoting the
off-label use of an FDA-approved medical device is not unlawful
under ‘traditional state tort law which had predated the federal
enactments in question[].’’277
However, the Riley court did recognize that the plaintiff could
have avoided implied preemption if Cordis (1) promoted the off-label
use in a manner unauthorized by the FDCA, and (2) failed to include
adequate warnings about the off-label use it was promoting.278 The
first allegation would protect the claim from express preemption since
it is premised on a violation of the FDCA.279 The second allegation
would protect the claim from implied preemption because a duty to
warn physicians or patients when an injury is reasonably foreseeable
rests on traditional state law.280
Although the court granted leave to amend, it would be quite
difficult for the plaintiff in Riley to prevail on this narrow theory.281
The plaintiff’s claim would be expressly preempted if it solely alleged
that manufacturer’s off-label promotion triggered a duty to warn
about the off-label use. As the court explained, under the FDCA a
“manufacturer could disseminate information about an off-label use
of a device without triggering the duty to provide instructions or
warnings about that off-label use.”282 Therefore, the only way for
plaintiff to prevail on this theory would be if the manufacturer
changed the label while promoting off-label use.283 However, since
there are strict limitations on a manufacturer’s ability to change its
label post-approval, it likely will be difficult for plaintiff to amend the
complaint and survive preemption.284
In Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc., the court also held plaintiff’s offlabel promotion theory to be impliedly preempted.285 In Caplinger,
the plaintiff suffered an injury after Medtronic’s Infuse device was

276. Id. at 783.
277. Id. (quoting Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353
(2001)).
278. Id. at 784.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. ld. at 785; Eggen, supra note 69, at 188.
282. Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 782 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa–6(b) (2006)).
283. See id.
284. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(6)(A)(i) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(a) (2014); Riley,
625 F. Supp. 2d at 782 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa–6(b)); see also Eggen, supra note 69,
at 188.
285. See 921 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1219–20, 1224 (W.D. Okla. 2013).
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used for posterior-approach lumbar spine fusion surgery to correct a
degenerative disc condition.286 The use of Infuse during posterior
fusion surgery was off-label because the FDA approved Infuse for
anterior but not posterior surgery. The plaintiff brought a fraudulent
misrepresentation claim and a negligence claim based on the theory
that Medtronic promoted the off-label use of Infuse in posterior
fusion surgery while downplaying its risks.287 The court held that both
of these claims were impliedly preempted because promotion of offlabel use is governed by the FDCA.288 The court concluded that
“‘off-label use’ is a creature of the FDCA” and “is not a part of
Oklahoma substantive law . . . . While plaintiff couches her claim as a
state law negligence claim, this claim is, in substance, a claim for
violating the FDCA and, thus, is clearly preempted under Buckman
and § 337(a).”289
While these courts have interpreted Buckman broadly, other courts
have limited Buckman to only fraud-on-the-FDA claims.290 The Fifth
Circuit in Hughes held that the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim was
not impliedly preempted.291 As mentioned previously, Hughes
involved Boston Scientific’s alleged failure to report serious burns
associated with its uterine device in violation of the MDR
requirement to report “serious injuries” and “malfunctions.”292 The
court held that the plaintiff’s claim is not analogous to Buckman,
where “plaintiff did not assert a violation of a state tort duty,”
because here, “Hughes is asserting a Mississippi tort claim based on
the underlying state duty to warn about the dangers or risks of
product . . . . [H]er claim is comparable to the tort claims in Silkwood
and Lohr that Buckman recognized as surviving implied
preemption.”293
The Seventh Circuit in Bausch v. Stryker Corp. reached a similar
result as the Fifth Circuit. In Bausch, the Seventh Circuit held that
286. Id. at 1209.
287. Id. at 1221.
288. “To determine whether said conduct is improper would require reliance on
the requirements of the FDCA. Further, even the concept of ‘off-label use’ is a
creature of the FDCA, is defined by the FDCA, and is not a part of Oklahoma
substantive law. While plaintiff couches her claim as a state law negligence claim, this
claim is, in substance, a claim for violating the FDCA and, thus, is clearly preempted
under Buckman and § 337(a).” Id. at 1219–20, 1224.
289. Id.
290. See Prince, supra note 34, at 1075.
291. Hughes v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 776 (5th Cir. 2011); see also 21
U.S.C. § 360i(a)(1) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 803.50(a) (2014).
292. See supra notes 219–26 and accompanying text.
293. Hughes, 631 F.3d at 775.
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plaintiff’s manufacturing defect claim, alleging that Stryker’s hip
implant system was adulterated in violation of the CGMPs, was not
impliedly preempted.294 The Seventh Circuit rejected Stryker’s
argument that there is “no state tort duty to manufacture a product
that is not adulterated.”295 The court stated that “[w]hile there may
not be a ‘traditional state law’ claim for an ‘adulterated’
product . . . the federal definition of adulterated medical devices is
tied directly to the duty of manufacturers to avoid foreseeable
dangers.”296 This stands in direct contrast to Lewkut, where the court
held that virtually the same claim was impliedly preempted.297
Like the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit in Stengel
has refused to extend Buckman to impliedly preempt traditional state
law tort claims.298 After a catheter manufactured by Medtronic was
implanted into Richard Stengel’s abdomen, a granuloma formed at
the catheter tip, rendering Stengel permanently paraplegic in 2005.299
The Stengels alleged that if Medtronic warned physicians that the
catheter could cause a granuloma prior to Stengel’s injury, Stengel’s
symptoms would have been diagnosed sooner, which in turn would
have prevented his paralysis.300
The Stengels’ failure-to-warn claim was premised on the theory
that Medtronic breached its post-sale duty to report adverse events to
the FDA.301 The Stengels allege that Medtronic knew that a
granuloma could form at the catheter tip prior to Stengel’s injury, but
failed to report that information to the FDA.302 Particularly,
according to the Stengels, FDA inspections in 2006 and 2007 revealed
that Medtronic knew about the risks of a granuloma forming at the
catheter tip.303 After the inspection, the FDA sent a warning letter to

294. See 630 F.3d 546, 558 (7th Cir. 2010).
295. Id. at 557.
296. Id.
297. Compare Lewkut v. Stryker Corp., 724 F. Supp. 2d 648, 660 (S.D. Tex. 2010)
(holding that plaintiff’s manufacturing defect claim alleging that the Trident hip
implant system was adulterated in violation of the CGMPs was impliedly preempted),
with Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 556–57 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that
plaintiff’s manufacturing defect claim alleging that the Trident hip implant system
was adulterated in violation of the CGMPs was not impliedly preempted).
298. Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1234 (9th Cir. 2013).
299. Id. at 1227.
300. See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 33, at 6.
301. Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1232.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1227.
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Medtronic stating that Medtronic “misbranded” its device in violation
of FDCA regulations.304
Before the en banc rehearing, the Ninth Circuit held that the
Stengels’ failure-to-warn claim was impliedly preempted by
Buckman.305 However, en banc, the full court reversed.306 The Ninth
Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ failure to warn the FDA claim rested
on traditional state law because “Arizona law contemplates a warning
to a third party such as the FDA.”307 Under Arizona law, a
manufacturer’s duty to a third party is satisfied if “there is ‘reasonable
assurance that the information will reach those whose safety depends
on their having it.’”308 In his concurrence, Judge Watford echoed the
majority but put more of an emphasis on public policy objectives.309
Watford argued that “there is no question that state law has an
important and legitimate role to play in regulating the adequacy of
post-sale warnings for products already on the market.”310
The California Court of Appeals affirmed Stengel in a recent case
even though Stengel was not binding on the court.311 In Coleman v.
Medtronic, Inc., Medtronic allegedly failed to report adverse events
associated with the off-label use of Infuse in posterior fusion
Medtronic argued that plaintiff’s claim should be
surgery.312
impliedly preempted because there is no duty to warn the FDA under
state law, only a duty to warn physicians who then warn patients.313
The court rejected Medtronic’s argument because a duty to warn the
FDA is contemplated by California’s duty to “warn of a particular
risk that was known or knowable in light of the generally recognized
and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge available at the

304. Id.
305. Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 676 F.3d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc
granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012), and rev’d on reh’g en banc, 704 F.3d 1224 (9th
Cir. 2013).
306. Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1234.
307. Id. at 1233.
308. Id. (quoting Wilson v. U.S. Elevator Corp., 193 Ariz. 251, 972 P.2d 235, 237
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
309. Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1235 (Watford, J., concurring); see also Eggen, supra note
69, at 200.
310. Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1235 (Watford, J., concurring).
311. Coleman v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 311 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)
(“We recognize, of course, that Stengel III is not binding on this court but it is
persuasive authority that we elect to follow.”).
312. Id. at 314.
313. Id. at 312.
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time of manufacture and distribution.”314 The court further reasoned
the “duty to warn should not be so narrowly defined as to exclude a
requirement to file adverse event reports with the FDA if that is the
only available method to warn doctors and consumers.”315 Hence, the
court concluded that plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim premised on
violations of the MDR is not impliedly preempted.
The court similarly held that the plaintiff’s negligence per se claim,
premised on Medtronic’s failure to report adverse events, was not
impliedly preempted.316 The court held that in actions involving
negligence per se, the federal requirement is only used to establish
the standard of care; the state law claim as a whole still very much
relies on traditional state law.317 The court stated “Coleman uses the
negligence per se doctrine, well recognized in California tort law, to
ensure that the state law duty he alleges directly parallels federal law;
however, he is pursuing a remedy under state law, not federal law.”318
Lastly, the Coleman court held that plaintiff’s alternative
negligence per se theory, that Medtronic promoted the off-label use
of posterior surgery in a manner unauthorized by the FDCA, was also
not impliedly preempted.319 The court held that plaintiff’s off-label
promotion theory “is rooted in traditional state tort law and exists
regardless of the FDCA and its regulations because the manufacturer
of a medical device owes a duty of reasonable care to the consumer of
such a device even in the absence of FDA regulations.”320
III. ARGUMENTS IN STENGEL V. MEDTRONIC, INC.
After the Ninth Circuit in Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc. ruled that
plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claim was not preempted either expressly or
impliedly, Medtronic filed a petition for certiorari.321 In its petition,
Medtronic made two arguments as to why the Ninth Circuit’s decision
should be reversed. First, it argued that the Stengels’ failure-to-warn
claim should be expressly preempted because they have not alleged a
federal requirement specific to the device in question.322 Second, it

314. Id. at 311 (quoting Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 53 Cal. 3d
987, 1002 (1991)).
315. Id. at 312.
316. Id. at 315.
317. See id. at 316.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 316.
320. Id.
321. See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 8–9.
322. See id. at 18.
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asserted that the Stengels’ failure-to-warn claim should be impliedly
preempted because it is not independent of the MDA
requirements.323 In its brief in opposition, the Stengels argued that a
state law claim premised on a generally applicable requirement such
as the MDR should survive both express and implied preemption.324
The United States filed an amicus curiae brief that is generally in
accord with the Stengels’ position.325
Although the Supreme Court ultimately denied Medtronic’s
petition for certiorari,326 the arguments expressed in the Stengel briefs
are well-crafted and will likely be used by plaintiffs and defendants in
future cases. This is especially true now that the Supreme Court has
allowed the circuit split on the contours of the parallel claim
exception to continue. Further, this Note argues that the Supreme
Court should bridge the divide amongst the circuits in a subsequent
case, and predicts that the arguments that the Supreme Court will be
presented with will be similar to the arguments made in Stengel.
A. The General/Device-Specific Argument in Stengel

1.

The Argument for a Circuit Split

The Stengels’ failure-to-warn claim relies on a violation of a
generally applicable or industry-wide violation of the FDA’s MDRs.
Specifically, the claim relies on 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a) and 21 C.F.R. §
803.50(a), which require a manufacturer to report information that
reasonably suggests that the device “may have caused or contributed
to a death or serious injury.”327 In its petition for certiorari,
Medtronic argues that there is a circuit split on whether such a
generally applicable requirement like the MDR survives express
preemption.328 According to Medtronic, the Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits have held that only claims premised on a violation of a
device-specific requirement survive preemption.329 By contrast, the
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have allowed generally applicable
requirements to survive preemption.330

323. Id. at 22.
324. Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 33, at 13, 18.
325. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 4, at 13–14, 21–22.
326. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
327. 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 803.50(a) (2014); Stengel v. Medtronic,
Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2013).
328. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 19.
329. Id.
330. Id.
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The Argument Against a Circuit Split

The Stengels denied the existence of a circuit split. The Stengels
argued that the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have held that a
violation of a generally applicable requirement survives express
preemption. However, according to the Stengels, the Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits are consistent with the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuit opinions. The Stengels contended that in the Eighth and
Eleventh Circuit opinions, Sprint Fidelis and Wolicki-Gables, the
plaintiffs “failed to tie their particular claims to the violation of any
[particular] federal requirement, either general or device-specific.”331
Therefore, no circuit court opinion stands for the proposition that
plaintiff must plead a device-specific federal requirement.332
The United States as amicus curiae agreed with the Stengels’
proposition that the circuits do not diverge on whether a requirement
be general or device-specific.333 The United States contended that
“[m]ost courts . . . have held that a state requirement is saved from
express preemption if it parallels a federal requirement of any kind,
be it device-specific or general.”334 According to the United States,
although some courts have preempted claims premised on a generally
applicable requirement, “the cases provide no explanation as to why
that would be so, and they appear ultimately to rest on deficiencies in
the plaintiff’s pleadings.”335

3.

The Argument for the General/Specific Distinction

After Medtronic made the argument for a circuit split, it urged that
a claim premised on a generally applicable federal requirement is
expressly preempted because the federal requirement must be
specific to the device in question.336 Medtronic relied on Lohr in
support of its proposition—“this Court held in Lohr that generalized
federal duties that apply to all medical devices are not federal
‘requirements’ within the meaning of § 360k(a).”337 According to
Medtronic, the MDR is too generalized to be a federal requirement
under § 360k because it applies to all medical devices.338 To fall

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 33, at 10.

Id.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 4, at 16.

Id. at 17.
Id.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 30–32.
Id. at 31 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 501(1996)).
Id.
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within the parallel claim exception, the violation of a federal
requirement must run parallel to a violation of state law duty.339
Hence, under Medtronic’s logic, plaintiff’s state law claim premised
on a generalized violation of a federal duty cannot fit within the
parallel claim exception because a generalized federal duty is not a
requirement under § 360k(a).340
Medtronic further claimed that the Ninth Circuit’s decision to
allow generally applicable requirements to escape preemption would
“open the floodgates to potentially massive state-law liability imposed
by lay juries asked to second-guess the FDA’s expert regulatory
oversight.”341 Medtronic seemed to take the position that a state law
claim based on such a vague violation of the FDA regulations would
afford the jury the discretion to second-guess the decisions of the
FDA and thus impose state requirements “different from or in
addition to” those imposed by the FDA.342

4.

The Argument Against a General/Specific Distinction

The Stengels took the contrary position that “nothing in § 360k(a),

Lohr, or Riegel demands that the requirement be specific to a
particular device.”343 According to the Stengels, the Supreme Court
in Lohr “held, unanimously, that the Lohr’s labeling claims were not
preempted . . . although the device was subject to no device-specific
requirements at all.”344 The Stengels also argued that in Bates, the
Supreme Court held that plaintiff’s claim survived preemption
although there was no product-specific labeling requirement.345
The United States agreed with the conclusion reached by the
Stengels and the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, but for
different reasons. According to the United States, the Court need not
analyze whether a generally applicable requirement fits within the
parallel claim exception because a generally applicable requirement
has no preemptive effect to begin with.346 This is in contrast to the
Stengels and the circuit courts, who assumed that all federal
requirements, general or specific, have preemptive effect and thus
must fit within the parallel claim exception to avoid express

339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

See supra Part II.B.2.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 31.
Id. at 32 (citing Lohr, 518 U.S. at 501).
See generally id.
Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 33, at 10.
Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).

Id.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 4, at 10–13.
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preemption. The United States relied on Lohr, FDA regulations, and
public policy objectives for its proposition that a generally applicable
requirement has no preemptive effect whatsoever.347
B.

The Implied Preemption Argument in Stengel

1.

The Argument for a Circuit Split

As it does with express preemption, Medtronic argued that the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Stengel deepens a split amongst the circuits
as to whether the MDA impliedly preempts state law claims based on
a manufacturer’s failure to report adverse events to the FDA.348
While the Sixth Circuit in Cupek and the Eighth Circuit in Sprint
Fidelis have impliedly preempted such claims, the Fifth Circuit in
Hughes and the Ninth Circuit in Stengel have reached the opposite
conclusion.349

2.

The Argument Against a Circuit Split

The Stengels, on the other hand, denied the existence of a circuit
split on whether state law failure-to-warn-the-FDA claims are
impliedly preempted.350 They argued that “the cases cited by
Medtronic do not reflect different approaches to preemption but
rather different outcomes based on different pleadings.”351 The
Stengels contended that Cupek and Sprint Fidelis are consistent with
the decisions of the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.352 In Cupek
and Sprint Fidelis, the plaintiff only alleged that the manufacturer
breached a duty to the government, whereas in Hughes and Stengel
the plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer breached a duty to the
plaintiff.353 In Cupek and Sprint Fidelis, the courts impliedly
preempted plaintiffs’ state law claims because they were disguised
fraud on the FDA claims that were dependent upon the FDCA.
They were dependent upon the FDCA because they would not have

347. Id.
348. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 10.
349. See In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d
1200, 1205–06 (8th Cir. 2010); Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc., 405 F.3d 421, 423–24 (6th
Cir. 2005). But cf. Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1233 (9th Cir. 2013);
Hughes v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 775–76 (5th Cir. 2011).
350. Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 33, at 14.
351. Id. at 15.
352. See id.
353. Id. at 14–15.
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been cognizable without an FDA violation.354 In contrast, the claims
in Stengel and Hughes were not impliedly preempted because
plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer violated a duty owed to the
plaintiff.355 A claim premised on a duty owed to the plaintiff rests on
traditional state law.356 The United States, as amicus curiae, also
takes the Stengels’ position that there is no circuit split as to whether
state law tort claims are impliedly preempted.357

3.

The Argument for Implied Preemption

Medtronic urged the Supreme Court to take the position of the
Sixth and Eighth Circuits because they have interpreted Buckman
“correctly,” while the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have not.358 Medtronic
read Buckman as holding that “the state law duty on which the claim
is based must be independent of any duty imposed by the MDA.”359
Medtronic explained that the Stengels’ state law claim is not
independent of any federal duty because there is no duty for
manufacturers to submit information to the FDA under Arizona
law.360 According to Medtronic, Arizona law only imposes a general
duty to warn physicians and consumers; it does not impose a duty to
warn the federal government.361 Further, a state law duty requiring
manufacturers to submit information to the federal government
would “defy settled principles of federalism and sovereignty.”362
Therefore, since plaintiffs’ state law claim is not independent of the
federal duty alleged, their claim should be impliedly preempted as in
Buckman.363
In addition, Medtronic argued that the Stengels’ failure-to-warn
claim should be impliedly preempted for public policy reasons
because, as in Buckman, a failure-to-warn claim directly interferes
with the regulatory scheme of the FDA.364 First, a state law violation
would interfere with the FDA’s authority to determine whether to
withdraw approval when the manufacturer has failed to report
354. See id.
355. See id.
356. See id. at 14–16.
357. See id. at 22–23.
358. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 22.
359. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 7, Medtronic, Inc. v. Stengel, 134 S. Ct. 375
(2013) (No. 12-1351).
360. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 25.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 23–24.
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adverse events.365 Second, complying with state law would increase
the burdens on manufacturers and discourage them from seeking
approval, or induce them to submit a deluge of adverse event reports
that the FDA neither wants nor needs.366 Third, the causation inquiry
under state tort law would burden the FDA.367 Medtronic claimed
that causation can only be proven by establishing how the FDA
would have responded if Medtronic submitted adverse event
reports.368 Such an inquiry would “ensnare agency personnel in
burdensome discovery and divert the agency from its regulatory
mission.”369 Further, the causation inquiry would require a lay jury to
determine what the FDA should have done if it had this information,
which “would authorize lay juries to superintend the FDA’s decisionmaking.”370

4.

The Argument Against Implied Preemption

The Stengels, on the other hand, argued that their claim that
Medtronic breached its duty to report adverse events to the FDA is
based on “an independent state law duty, not a duty that exists only
under federal law.”371 They relied on the third-party duty-to-warn
doctrine to establish a state law duty that is independent of the
FDCA. The Stengels argued that under Arizona law “a warning to a
third party satisfies a manufacturer’s duty if, given the warning and
relationship of the third party, there is a reasonable assurance that the
information will reach those whose safety depends on their having
it.”372 In other words, Medtronic had a state law duty to warn the
FDA, which in turn should have warned physicians, who in turn
should have warned patients. The Stengels argued that Medtronic’s
ultimate duty was to the plaintiff, and thus Medtronic breached that
duty by failing to warn the FDA.373 According to the Stengels, then,
their claim is different than Buckman’s claim, in which the

365. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(e)(1)(D)(i) (2012); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 22, at 24.
366. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 24.
367. Id. at 28–29.
368. Id.
369. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 359, at 10.
370. Id.
371. Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 33, at 6.
372. Id. at 19; Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1233 (9th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Anguiano v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 808 F. Supp. 719, 723 (D. Ariz.
1992), aff’d, 44 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1995)).
373. Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 33, at 19.
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manufacturer only owed a duty to the FDA because here,
Medtronic’s ultimate duty was to the plaintiff.374
The Stengels also rejected Medtronic’s argument that the state law
claim would lead to second-guessing of FDA decision-making.375
They claimed that this case was unlike Buckman, where the jury
would have to speculate on whether the FDA would have approved
the drug in the absence of fraud, because “the FDA has already
decided [through its warning letter] that Medtronic had not
adequately complied with federal reporting requirements.”376 In its
reply brief, Medtronic made two points in response to the argument
that the FDA already determined Medtronic failed to comply with
the FDA. First, the warning letter does not constitute a final agency
action and thus does not represent a decision by the FDA that
Medtronic violated MDA requirements.377 Second, even if the FDA
made a final determination that Medtronic violated the MDA, the
state law claim would still invite a lay jury to “second-guess the
FDA’s carefully calibrated choice of remedy.”378
The United States made a different argument as to why the
Stengels’ claim should not be impliedly preempted.379 In fact, the
United States believed that the Stengels’ reliance on the third-party
duty-to-warn doctrine created a causation hurdle that may implicate
Buckman.380 There is a causation hurdle under the third-party dutyto-warn theory because plaintiff must show that the manufacturer
“should have reported adverse events to the FDA, which in turn
would have warned physicians.”381 The United States believed that
the “causation hurdle refers to the agency decision-making process
and therefore may implicate Buckman.”382 However, according to
the United States, the Stengels had a more natural theory of
causation that did not implicate Buckman.383 This theory alleged that,
upon learning of the adverse events associated with its catheter,
Medtronic should have strengthened the warning of its device.384 The

374. Id.
375. Id. at 20.
376. Id.
377. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 359, at 9.
378. Id.
379. Compare Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 33, at 19, with Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 4, at 19.
380. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 4, at 19.
381. See id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. See id.
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CBE regulation allows a manufacturer to revise a device’s labeling,
without prior FDA approval.385 According to the United States, this
CBE theory relies on traditional state law and thus avoids Buckman
because it does not depend upon the FDA to warn doctors, but rather
requires the manufacturer to warn doctors directly by revising its
label.
In fact, the United States contended that a claim premised on the
CBE process “would mirror the failure to warn claim against the
prescription drug manufacturer that this Court held was not impliedly
preempted in Wyeth.”386 In Wyeth v. Levine, plaintiff alleged that
Wyeth failed to warn about the dangers of the “IV push method” in
injecting the drug Phenergan.387 Wyeth argued that Levine’s claim
should be subject to implied conflict preemption/impossibility
preemption because it is impossible for Wyeth to comply with state
law requiring Wyeth to strengthen its warning and federal law, which
prevents a manufacturer from changing its warning without FDA
approval.388 The Supreme Court rejected Wyeth’s argument because
the CBE regulation allows a manufacturer to unilaterally strengthen
its warning.389 Therefore, the Supreme Court found it is possible for
manufacturers to comply with both state and federal law.390 Wyeth
also made an obstacle preemption argument similar to that of
Buckman, that strengthening its warning would “obstruct the
purposes and objectives of federal drug labeling.”391 The Supreme
Court was also not persuaded by this argument.392 The United States,
as amicus curiae in Stengel, argued that, like in Wyeth, the Stengels’

385. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) (2014); Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, supra note 4, at 2.
386. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 4, at 20.
387. Phernagen can be injected through the “IV push method,” whereby the drug
is directly injected into the patient’s vein or through the “IV drip method,” whereby
the drug is introduced into a saline solution and slowly descends into the vein
through a catheter. The “IV push method” poses a greater risk than the “IV drip
method.” Plaintiff argued that the manufacturer should have instructed to use the
“IV drip method” instead of the “IV push method.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555,
560 (2009).
388. Id. at 570.
389. “The CBE regulation permitted Wyeth to unilaterally strengthen its warning,
and the mere fact that the FDA approved Phenergan’s label does not establish that it
would have prohibited such a change.” Id. at 573.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. “Wyeth has not persuaded us that failure-to-warn claims like Levine’s
obstruct the federal regulation of drug labeling.” Id. at 581.
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claim should not be preempted, because the CBE regulation also
applies to medical devices.393
IV. WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED
STENGELS’ CLAIM TO SURVIVE EXPRESS AND IMPLIED
PREEMPTION
The Supreme Court was faced with an array of complex arguments
on both the respondent and petitioner’s side. This Note argues that
the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in Stengel v.
Medtronic to clarify the confusion surrounding exactly which claims
survive express and implied preemption. In the future, the circuit
courts and the Supreme Court should adopt a liberal approach in
allowing plaintiffs to plead violations of generally applicable
requirements, but a conservative approach in applying Buckman to
impliedly preempt state law tort claims.
A. Violations of Generally Applicable Federal Requirements
Should Survive Preemption

1.

There Is a Circuit Split on Whether a Federal Requirement must
Be Generally Applicable or Device-Specific

The Supreme Court should have granted Medtronic’s petition for
certiorari because there is indeed a circuit split on whether the federal
requirement must be device-specific or generally applicable.
Although the Supreme Court skirted the issue by denying certiorari
in Stengel, hopefully they will mend the circuit split in the near future.
However, it must first be noted that the Stengels’ argument—that
there is not a circuit split, but rather that the different outcomes in the
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits reflect problems of pleading—has some
merit. In Sprint Fidelis and Wolicki-Gables, the two cases holding
that a requirement be device-specific, the plaintiffs did not tie their
injuries to any particular requirement, whether general or specific. In
Wolicki-Gables, the plaintiffs did not cite a particular federal
requirement that was violated; instead, they merely alleged that the
manufacturer failed to reasonably design, manufacture, and provide
adequate warnings of its pump system.394
The same can be said about Sprint Fidelis, to an extent. In Sprint
Fidelis, the Eighth Circuit found plaintiff’s manufacturing defect
claim to allege that “state law entitles every person who has an
393. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 4, at 20.
394. See supra notes 187–93 and accompanying text.
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implanted Sprint Fidelis lead[] to damages . . . because all Sprint
Fidelis leads have an unreasonably high risk of fracture failure.”395
Therefore, the problem with this claim is that, although pleaded as a
parallel manufacturing defect claim, in actuality it amounts to a
design defect claim.396 Design defect claims are almost always
expressly preempted under Riegel.397 It is plausible that the court’s
perception of the plaintiff’s claim as a design defect claim was due to
her reliance on the generally applicable CGMPs. At the same time, it
is also plausible that the court would not view plaintiff’s claim as a
design defect claim if she were more concrete in tying her injury to
the manufacturer’s violation of the CGMP.
In comparison to Wolicki-Gables and Sprint Fidelis, the pleadings
presented in the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits may have been
stronger. As evidenced by Bass, Howard, and Hughes, the plaintiffs’
claims in these circuits may have survived preemption because the
manufacturers’ violation of a generally applicable regulation was tied
to plaintiff’s injury. First, in Bass, the complaint alleged that Stryker
violated 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.20(a), 820.20(b)(2), and 820.70(e), which
caused Bass to suffer from a loose Shell due to lack of bony
ingrowth.398 Second, in Howard, the complaint alleged that Sulzer
violated 21 C.F.R. § 820.70(h) by leaving oil on its machine, which
thereby caused plaintiff’s knee implant to fail.399 Third, in Hughes,
the complaint alleged that if Boston Scientific had complied with 21
C.F.R. § 803.50(a) and reported second-degree burns, the FDA would
have taken action, thereby preventing plaintiff from suffering from
such a burn.400
Although the pleadings in Sprint Fidelis and Wolicki-Gables may
have been weaker than their counterparts, there are a number of
district court pleadings that failed to survive preemption despite being
as concrete as those in the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits. For
example, in Ilarraza, the Eastern District of New York dismissed
395. In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200,
1207 (8th Cir. 2010).
396. Prince, supra note 34, at 1056.
397. Id. (“Thus, as pleaded and argued, the manufacturing defect claims are not
parallel, they are a frontal assault on the FDA’s decision to approve a PMA
Supplement after weighing the product’s benefits against its inherent risks.”); see
Whitney, supra note 175 at 127 (contending “that [a] design defect claim which
challenges FDA’s findings concerning the safety of a device’s design imposes
requirements that are different from, or in addition to, federal regulations and
therefore is preempted”).
398. Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 510 (5th Cir. 2012).
399. Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 382 F. App’x 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2010).
400. Hughes v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 2011).
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plaintiff’s claims even though the plaintiff referenced particular
CGMP violations.401 Further, in Parker v. Stryker, the progeny of
Sprint Fidelis, the District Court of Colorado dismissed plaintiff’s
parallel claims against Stryker’s Trident hip implant system, even
though plaintiff referenced particular CGMP violations and warning
letters issued by the FDA which found Stryker violated the MDR and
CGMPs.402 The Parker decision is in conflict with that of Seventh
Circuit in Bausch where plaintiff referenced the same CGMP
violations and warning letters regarding the Trident System and yet
survived dismissal.403
The Supreme Court also should have more closely considered the
language in Sprint Fidelis and Wolicki-Gables, which clearly states
that the plaintiff must allege a violation of a specific requirement in
the device’s PMA. In Wolicki-Gables, the Eleventh Circuit held that
a plaintiff must point to “specific PMA requirements in the PMA
approval.”404 In Sprint Fidelis, the Eighth Circuit stated that
“[p]laintiffs simply failed to adequately plead that Medtronic violated
a federal requirement specific to the FDA’s PMA approval.”405
Further, although some courts have distinguished the different
outcomes amongst the Circuits, others have more candidly recognized
the divide.406 For these reasons, the divide amongst the lower courts
is real, and the Supreme Court ought to bridge the divide. In bridging
the divide, the Supreme Court should hold that a violation of a
generally applicable requirement survives express preemption.

2.

Generally Applicable Requirements Should Escape Preemption

Public policy and precedent dictate that violations of a generally
applicable requirement escape preemption. There are two alternative

401. Ilarraza v. Medtronic, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 582, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
402. Parker v. Stryker Corp., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1301 (D. Colo. 2008).
403. Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 556, 559 (7th Cir. 2010).
404. Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 634 F.3d 1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 2011)
(emphasis added).
405. In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200,
1207 (8th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
406. Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 382 F. App’x 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2010)
(holding “that the alleged violations in Sprint Fidelis were different from the ones
here; and moreover the plaintiff there did not even identify a specific GMP that he
thought had been violated”); Bausch, 630 F.3d at 554 (holding “the [Sprint Fidelis]
case might well be distinguishable from our case based on the Medtronic Leads’
plaintiffs’ deliberate decision not to seek discovery and to assert claims for patients
whose devices had not failed”). But cf. Bausch, Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501,
511–12 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that “the circuits are not in complete agreement as to
what constitutes a sufficient pleading with regard to a CGMP.”)
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holdings by the Supreme Court that would reach this end goal: (1)
violations of generally applicable requirements have no preemptive
effect whatsoever, or (2) violations of generally applicable
requirements fall within the parallel claim exception. Admittedly,
these are two divergent approaches that reach the same result of
allowing Stengels’ claims to avoid preemption. Fitting generally
applicable requirements within the parallel claim exception is clearly
the better of the two approaches.
Affording generalized
requirements no preemptive effect would reduce the parallel claim
exception to a nullity.407 It would also reach the perverse result of
making it easier for claims premised on a generally applicable
requirement to avoid preemption than it would be for a devicespecific requirement.408 Nonetheless, either approach is acceptable
because it allows state law claims premised on the generally
applicable MDRs or CGMPs to escape preemption. Allowing these
generalized requirements to avoid preemption is not only consistent
with Lohr and § 360k, but it is also necessary given the practical
difficulties of alleging a device-specific requirement at the pleading
stage.

a.

Why Violations of Generally Applicable Requirements Should
Have no Preemptive Effect

The United States’ argument that generally applicable
requirements have no preemptive effect because they are not federal
requirements under § 360(k) does have support in Lohr. The Lohr
court stated that “in most cases a state law will be pre-empted only to
the extent that the FDA has promulgated a relevant federal
‘requirement.’”409 It would seem that “relevant” most likely means
device-specific.410 In addition, 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) provides that
“[s]tate or local requirements are preempted only when [the FDA]
has established specific counterpart regulations or there are other
specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the
[FDCA].”411 For these reasons, it is plausible that a regulation has to

407. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
408. See id.
409. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996) (emphasis added).
410. In discussing the generality of the CGMPs, the Lohr Court stated that “the
generality of those requirements make this quite unlike a case in which the Federal
Government has weighed the competing interests relevant to the particular
requirement in question. . . .” Id. at 501 (emphasis added).
411. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 4, at 11.
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be device-specific to have preemptive effect pursuant to Lohr and
FDCA regulations.
Further, it can be argued that there would be minimal interference
with the FDA decision-making process if a generally applicable
requirement had no preemptive effect.412 Only a device-specific
requirement in the PMA reflects the FDA’s weighing of the risks and
benefits of the device in question.413 However, as explained in more
detail below, a compelling argument can be made that a generally
applicable requirement interferes with FDA regulatory objectives.414
This is because the open-ended nature of a generally applicable
requirement provides a jury greater discretion in interpreting the
FDA’s regulations.

b.

Why Generally Applicable Requirements Should Fall Within the
Parallel Claim Exception

Assuming arguendo that the Supreme Court rules that a generally
applicable requirement has preemptive effect, preemption can still be
avoided if the requirements fall within the parallel claim exception.
However, Medtronic argues that only violations of a device-specific
federal requirement fall within the parallel claim exception, whereas
generally applicable requirements do not run parallel, and thus are
expressly preempted.415 Medtronic’s distinction between specific and
generally applicable requirements is misplaced.
Although Lohr, as mentioned above, suggests that there is a
distinction between specific and general requirements, there is
nothing in the text of § 360k to suggest a distinction.416 Section 360k
preempts a claim that imposes on a manufacturer “any
requirement . . . which is different from, or in addition to, any
requirement applicable under this chapter to the device.”417 Because
§ 360k uses the broad phrase “any requirement,” generally applicable
requirements should fall within its purview.418 Further, there is
nothing to suggest that generally applicable requirements are any less
of a requirement than device-specific ones. First, the generally
applicable CGMPs, QSRs, and MDRs refer to themselves as

412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

Id.
Id.
See infra note 427 and accompanying text.
See supra note 336–40 and accompanying text.
See supra, note 343–44 and accompanying text.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012) (emphasis added).

Id.; Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 555 (7th Cir. 2010).
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requirements.419 Second, generally applicable requirements are as
legally binding as device-specific requirements.420 For instance,
failure to comply with the QSRs, CGMPs, and MDRs can result in
Third, the differences between the two
regulatory action.421
requirements are not intransigent, as generally applicable
requirements can become device-specific requirements. As the Sixth
Circuit noted in Howard, the CGMP standards can be incorporated
into the PMA, which would transform them from industry-wide
standards to device-specific requirements.422 For these reasons, if
device-specific regulations constitute requirements, then so should
generally applicable ones. Therefore, if the Court fails to find that a
generally applicable requirement has preemptive effect, it should at
the very least find that a generally applicable requirement avoids
preemption because it falls within the parallel claim exception.
Medtronic twisted Lohr into holding that a state law claim
premised on a violation of a generally applicable requirement does
not fall within the parallel claim exception.423 The Lohr court stated
that the CGMPs “reflect important but entirely generic concerns
about device regulation generally” and that a requirement must be
“‘applicable to the device’ in question.”424 Medtronic argues that
under Lohr, generally applicable regulations do not constitute
requirements and thus cannot parallel state law.425 However,
Medtronic’s argument should be rejected. If a generally applicable
regulation is not a requirement under § 360k, it would be more
consistent with Lohr if that requirement had no preemptive effect.426

419. 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.1; 803.50(a) (2014).
420. “[F]ederal law is clear: for manufacturers of Class III medical devices, the
Quality System Regulations and Current Good Manufacturing Practices adopted by
the FDA under its delegated regulatory authority are legally binding requirements
‘under this chapter.’” Bausch, 630 F.3d at 555 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 820.1).
421. 21 C.F.R. § 820.1(c) (providing that “the failure to comply with any applicable
provision in this part [of the regulations] renders a device adulterated under section
501(h) of the act. Such a device, as well as any person responsible for the failure to
comply, is subject to regulatory action.”); see also CCH Drug & Cosmetics L. Rep. ¶
350,140 (Apr. 1, 1996), available at 1996 WL 34474338 (“Failure to comply with the
MDR requirements is a prohibited act under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FD&C Act). Commission of a prohibited act may subject user facilities to injunction
proceedings under Section 302 and criminal penalties under Section 303 of the FD&C
Act.”).
422. Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 382 F. App’x 436, 439 (6th Cir. 2010).
423. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 31.
424. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 501 (1996); see also Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 31.
425. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 31.
426. See supra notes 409–11 and accompanying text.
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Medtronic’s proposition would lead to the absurd result of treating
generally applicable regulations as requirements to give them
preemptive effect, but then treat them as if they were not
requirements to avoid a parallel claim analysis. Such a result would
further complicate an already very complicated preemption doctrine.
Medtronic’s policy argument, that allowing claims premised on
generally applicable requirements can lead to jury second-guessing of
FDA decisions, has some merit, but that concern is ultimately
overblown. Admittedly, compared to the extensive and detailed
procedures specified in the PMA, the CGMPs and MDRs are vague
and open-ended in order to give the manufacturer flexibility to
implement best practices.427 However, the fear of jury secondguessing is likely overstated for several reasons. First, as the Court
explained in Bausch, the meaning of FDA regulations is a matter of
law for the judge, not the jury, to decide.428
Since judicial
interpretation of FDA regulations is subject to the federal appeals
process, the interpretation of FDA regulations should be relatively
uniform.429 Second, a jury likely will be presented with a narrow
question, such as whether the manufacturer submitted reports to the
FDA when the device contributed to death or serious injury. This is a
common sense question that would not superintend the FDA’s
scientific expertise. A jury would not have to conjure what is a
serious injury because a “serious injury” is defined in the MDR.430
Third, as in Hughes and Stengel, presenting the jury with the FDA
warning letters, which have already determined the manufacturer
failed to comply with the MDR, will ensure that the jury does not find
a violation beyond what the FDA found.431
Putting precedent aside, a generally applicable requirement should
also avoid express preemption due to the difficulty in alleging a
device-specific requirement. Plaintiffs may not have the opportunity
for discovery during the pleading stage.432 As both the majority in
427. Howard, 382 F. App’x at 442 (Guy, J., dissenting).
428. Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 556 (7th Cir. 2010).
429. Id.
430. MDR limits serious injuries to: “injury or illness that: (1) ls life-threatening,
(2) Results in permanent impairment of a body function or permanent damage to a
body structure, or (3) Necessitates medical or surgical intervention to preclude
permanent impairment of a body function or permanent damage to a body
structure.” 21 C.F.R. § 803.3 (2014).
431. See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 359, at 9.
432. Compare In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623
F.3d 1200, 1207 (8th Cir. 2010) (dismissing plaintiff’s complaint in part because
plaintiff waived the opportunity for discovery), with Bausch, 630 F.3d at 561
(surviving dismissal at the complaint stage where plaintiff never had the opportunity
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Bausch and the dissent in Sprint Fidelis note, it is virtually impossible
for a plaintiff to plead a device-specific violation without discovery.433
To plead a device-specific violation, a plaintiff would need access to
information contained within the PMA, but this information is
generally proprietary and not obtainable without discovery.434 In the
failure-to-warn context, alleging a device-specific violation would
likely require access to mandatory adverse event reports or voluntary
adverse event reports.435 Mandatory adverse event reports, which
annually document the serious injuries or deaths associated with the
manufacturer’s device, may not even be discoverable at all.436
Although the consensus is that voluntary adverse event reports are
discoverable, it is practically impossible for the plaintiff to access both
types of adverse event reports without discovery.437
There are creative ways in which plaintiffs’ attorneys can try to
allege a device-specific requirement without discovery. Methods
include Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests to obtain portions
of the FDA’s PMA files, post-market surveillance studies, and
Establishment Inspection Reports (EIRs).438 Plaintiffs’ lawyers can
also obtain FDA advisory committee reports, public filings issued by
the manufacturer, and information on suspected deaths, injuries, and
malfunctions from the Manufacturer and User Facility Device
Experience (MAUDE) database.439 Although these approaches are a
cause for some optimism among plaintiff attorneys, obtaining PMA
documents in discovery is still far more likely to yield information
that the manufacturer violated a device-specific requirement.440

for discovery). See also Parker v. Stryker Corp., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (D. Colo.
2008) (denying defendant’s motion to stay discovery until after court rules on motion
to dismiss).
433. See Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d at 1209 (contending that
“[t]o apply Twombly rigidly without permitting discovery as to these [device-specific]
documents effectively creates an impossible-to-achieve specificity requirement”); see
also Bausch, 630 F.3d at 561.
434. Bausch, 630 F.3d at 561.
435. See Trevor K. Scheetz, Note, Say What You Mean: The Discoverability of
Medical Device Adverse Event Reports, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2011).
436. See 21 U.S.C. § 360i(b)(3) (2012); Scheetz, supra note 435, at 1124.
437. See Scheetz, supra note 435, at 1124.
438. EIRs “provide details regarding inspections of the manufacturer’s facilities
and outline observations of possible violations.” Mitchell M. Breit et al., Charting the
Course in Medical Device Preemption, TRIAL, Sept. 2013, at 28, 30.
439. The MAUDE database, an online database that monitors “suspected deviceassociated deaths, serious injuries, and malfunctions,” is somewhat accessible to the
public. Id. at 31.
440. Id. at 28.
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For the aforementioned reasons, state law tort claims based on
generally applicable federal requirements should not be expressly
preempted. Generally applicable requirements should either have no
preemptive effect at all, or at least fall into the parallel claim
exception. Although either conclusion would be acceptable, fitting
generally applicable requirements within the parallel claim exceptions
makes more sense. First, holding that generalized requirements have
no preemptive effect would reduce the parallel claim exception, that
the Court spent time to carve out in Lohr and Riegel, and then tried
to preserve in Bartlett, to a nullity.441 This is because if generalized
requirements had no preemptive effect, plaintiffs would sensibly try
to avoid preemption entirely by pleading a violation of a generalized
requirement rather than trying to fit their claims within the parallel
claim exception.
Additionally, if a generalized requirement had no preemptive
effect, it may be easier for plaintiff to avoid preemption by pleading a
violation of a generalized requirement than it would be for plaintiff to
plead a device-specific violation. A claim premised on a violation of a
device-specific requirement would have to fit within the parallel claim
exception, and thus undergo a genuine equivalency and implied
preemption analysis.442 However, if given no preemptive effect, a
generally applicable requirement would evade the parallel claim
analysis in its entirety. A more rigorous preemption analysis for
violations of device-specific requirements, as opposed to generalized
ones, is strange. A state law claim premised on a violation of a
device-specific requirement may be less likely to impose different or
additional requirements under § 360k. The FDA “weighed the
competing interests relevant to the particular requirement in
question” when it reviewed the device’s PMA application.443
441. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008); Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996); see also Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466,
2477 (2013). The Court recognized the parallel claim exception in all three of the
these cases.
442. See In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d
1200, 1208 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that plaintiff’s state law claim premised on the
FDCA was impliedly preempted. Although this involved a generally applicable
requirement, it is still possible that a device-specific requirement is impliedly
preempted. However, this is unlikely because state law enforcement of devicespecific requirements probably does not conflict with FDA objectives); McMullen v.
Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the federal
requirement and state requirement were expressly preempted because they were not
genuinely equivalent. Although the federal requirement that was not equivalent here
was the generally applicable CBE regulation, it is possible that a device-specific
requirement could not run parallel to a state law duty).
443. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 501.
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Therefore a jury award based on a manufacturer’s failure to comply
with device-specific PMA requirements probably would be less likely
to diverge from the FDA’s intentions than a violation of a generalized
requirement.
Further, such a rule could encourage plaintiff’s lawyers to rely on
industry-wide standards like the CGMP or MDR in their pleadings,
instead of trying to get their hands on more concrete, device-specific
information. While a holding that generally applicable requirements
have no preemptive effect gives greater leeway to generalized
requirements than device-specific ones, recognizing the parallel claim
exception properly treats both types of requirements with parity. For
these reasons, the Supreme Court should conduct a parallel claim
analysis and thus hold that a violation of the industry-wide MDR is
not expressly preempted.
B.

Traditional State Law Tort Claims Should Not Be Impliedly
Preempted

1.

There Is a Circuit Split on Whether State Law Tort Claims Are
Impliedly Preempted

In its petition for certiorari in Stengel, Medtronic argued that the
circuits are divided on whether state tort law claims are impliedly
preempted under Buckman. According to Medtronic, while the Sixth
and Eighth Circuits have impliedly preempted state tort law claims,
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have not.444 By contrast, the Stengels
contended that the different outcomes can be explained by
differences in pleading.445 They argued that, unlike Fifth and Ninth
Circuit cases where the claims were premised on a state law duty
owed to plaintiff, the claims in the Sixth and Eighth Circuit cases of
Cupek and Sprint Fidelis were premised on a duty owed only to the
FDA.446 There is a clear divide on the extent to which Buckman
applies to state law tort claims. The Supreme Court should have
granted certiorari in order to bridge the divide.
Despite the Stengels’ attempt to argue the contrary, the Fifth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuit decisions are irreconcilable with the Sixth
and Eighth Circuit decisions, as well as with several district court

444. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 20.
445. See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 33, at 14–15.
446. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 25–26.
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opinions.447 A brief comparison of these decisions reveals a clear
divide. In Sprint Fidelis, McClelland, and Wheeler, the courts have
impliedly preempted state law failure-to-warn claims premised on the
manufacturer’s failure to file adverse event reports.448 By contrast, in
the Fifth and Ninth Circuit decisions of Stengel and Hughes,
respectively, the courts held that state law failure-to-warn claims
premised on the manufacturer’s failure to file adverse event were not
impliedly preempted.449 In Lewkut, the district court held that a state
law tort claim premised on adulteration of the device was impliedly
preempted, whereas the Seventh Circuit in Bausch held the exact
opposite.450 In Riley and Caplinger, the district courts impliedly
preempted state law tort claims based on an off-label promotion
theory, while the California Court of Appeals in Coleman did not.451
The differences in state law cannot explain these different
outcomes. In all of the implied preemption cases, the state law tort
duty that the plaintiffs sought to impose was virtually the same.452
The Stengels argued that under Arizona law a manufacturer has as a
duty to warn a third party when “there is ‘reasonable assurance that
the information will reach those whose safety depends upon their
having it.’” 453 However, the third-party duty to warn is not unique to
Arizona. The third-party duty principle was taken from a comment in
the Second Restatement of Torts, and thus is a general proposition of
tort law.454
What explains the different outcomes is not differences in law or
pleading, but rather divergent judicial interpretations about
Buckman’s scope. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits interpreted

447. It is useful to look at district court opinions to determine how circuit courts
would rule, given the scant number of circuit court opinions on implied preemption
of Class III medical devices.
448. See, e.g., In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623
F.3d 1200, 1205 (8th Cir. 2010); McClelland v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 6:11-CV-1444ORL-36 KRS, 2012 WL 5077401, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2012); Wheeler v. DePuy
Spine, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
449. See Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1234 (9th Cir. 2013); Hughes v.
Bos. Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 775 (5th Cir. 2011).
450. See Lewkut v. Stryker Corp., 724 F. Supp. 2d 648, 660 (S.D. Tex. 2010). But cf.
Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 558 (7th Cir. 2010).
451. Compare Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1219–20 (W.D.
Okla. 2013), and Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 783 (D. Minn. 2009), with
Coleman v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 316 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
452. See supra notes 294–97 and accompanying text (explaining the similarities of
the duty imposed in Bausch and Lewkut, but conflicting outcomes).
453. See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 33, at 19.
454. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 cmt. n (1965); Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 17.
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Buckman to require that plaintiff’s claim (1) must be based on
traditional state tort law, and (2) “would not exist if the FDCA did
not exist.”455 According to Medtronic, though, the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits have eschewed the second prong; they have held that
plaintiff’s claim passes Buckman’s test merely if it is based on
traditional state law.456 However, the Ninth Circuit seems to be
applying Buckman’s second prong. In the view of these courts, the
state law tort claims they were presented with would exist if not for
the FDCA.457 Whether the Ninth Circuit is applying the additional
element or not, it is clear that the Ninth Circuit’s, as well as the Fifth
and Seventh Circuit’s interpretations of Buckman diverge from those
of the Sixth and Eighth Circuits. It could very well be that the
different outcomes reflect different political attitudes towards
preemption.458

2.

Traditional State Law Tort Claims Should Not Be Impliedly
Preempted by Buckman

The arguments that Medtronic and other manufacturers made as to
why traditional state law tort claims should implicate Buckman are
ultimately not compelling. One main argument is that if fraudulently
misrepresenting information to the FDA is impliedly preempted by
Buckman, then failing to report information to the FDA should also
fall within its ambit. This is because both types of claims involve the
failure to communicate properly with the FDA.459 Medtronic further
argued that, like in Buckman, the plaintiff’s claim is dependent upon
the FDA requirements because informing the FDA is a “critical
element” of the plaintiff’s claim.460 According to Medtronic, Arizona
common law does not impose a duty to warn the FDA, and thus the

455. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 17; Prince, supra note
34, at 1079.
456. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 11–12.
457. See Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1233 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding
that plaintiff’s claim “is a state-law claim that is independent of the FDA’s premarket approval process that was at issue in Buckman”).
458. Raymond, supra note 140, at 765 (2010) (“Preemption cuts along clear
ideological poles . . . . Democratic-appointed [federal] judges were more than 3 times
as likely to find ‘no preemption’ as Republican-appointed [federal] judges.”).
459. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 20–21; see generally
Coleman, v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), review
granted and opinion superseded sub nom., Coleman v. Medtronics, 323 P.3d 1 (Cal.
2014).
460. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 23.
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manufacturer’s duty to warn the FDA would not exist if it were not
for the FDA reporting requirements.461
Medtronic’s argument that plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim
premised on a third party duty to warn is dependent upon the FDCA
has validity. Under plaintiff’s third-party duty-to-warn theory, the
manufacturer has a duty to warn a third party like the FDA, who in
turn will warn physicians and consumers.462 However, the third-party
duty doctrine does not specifically contemplate warning the FDA.463
The Ninth Circuit cites Anguiano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.
in support of this proposition, but in that decision, a manufacturer
had a duty to warn another manufacturer who incorporated the
product of the first manufacturer.464 A state law duty for a
manufacturer to warn a federal regulator has never been
contemplated. Therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiff’s claim
fully rests on traditional state law, independent of the FDCA.
Nonetheless, the plaintiff’s claim based on the third-party duty-towarn doctrine should avoid the ambit of Buckman because there is at
least a semblance of a state law duty. Manufacturers have a duty to
provide reasonable care, which includes warning those who can be
foreseeably harmed.465
Further, it is hard to believe that the Supreme Court meant to
extend Buckman as far as the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have taken it.
The Supreme Court has recognized that in enacting the MDA, it was
never Congress’s intent to eliminate all state law claims. As the
Supreme Court said in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., “it is difficult
to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means
of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.”466 However,
impliedly preempting claims like that of the Stengels may do exactly
that—remove means of judicial recourse. Impliedly preempting

461. Id. at 24.
462. See supra notes 372–73 and accompanying text.
463. See supra notes 360–362 and accompanying text.
464. See Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1233 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing
Anguiano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nem0urs & Co., 44 F.3d 806, 811–12 (9th Cir. 1995));
see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 26.
465. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 398 (1916) (holding that a
manufacturer has a duty “either to exercise due care to warn users of the danger or to
take reasonable care to prevent the article sold from proving dangerous when
subjected only to customary usage”).
466. 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984); see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330
(2008) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996)) (holding that “§
360k does not prevent a State from providing a damages remedy for claims premised
on a violation of FDA regulations; the state duties in such a case ‘parallel,’ rather
than add to, federal requirements”).
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traditional state law tort claims, combined with the Supreme Court’s
express preemption decision in Riegel, would mean that nothing
would fit through the narrow gap and survive preemption.467 Further,
if all tort law claims were preempted, then it would render the
distinction the Supreme Court made in Riegel and Buckman between
express and implied preemption meaningless.
Another way plaintiffs could try to avoid the implied preemption
thicket would be alleging that Medtronic breached its duty to warn
physicians and patients. Such a claim obviously rests on traditional
state tort law. Buckman would not be implicated because plaintiff
would still have a theory of liability in the absence of the FDCA.468
However, as Judge Watford notes, alleging that a manufacturer
breached its duty to warn doctors could be expressly preempted.469
This is because to fit within the parallel claim exception the state law
duty alleged must be genuinely equivalent to a federal duty.470 The
CBE regulation allows, but does not require, the manufacturer to
strengthen its warnings.471 There is no provision in the FDCA
requiring the FDA to warn physicians; therefore, the imposition of a
state law duty requiring that physicians be warned is not genuinely
equivalent to the federal duty.472 Regardless, a plaintiff could avoid
express preemption by skirting the parallel claim exception. If the
Court rules that a generally applicable requirement has no
preemptive effect, then courts would not have to conduct a parallel
claim analysis, which means that the genuine equivalency rule would
not apply. Hence, a ruling that a generally applicable requirement
has no preemptive effect would likely cause a plaintiff to avoid both
express and implied preemption.

3.

Policy Arguments Against the Implied Preemption of
Traditional State Law Tort Claims

Although Medtronic looks to the public policy arguments in
Buckman to impliedly preempt Stengel’s failure-to-warn claim, these
arguments have more force in the in fraud-on-the-FDA context than
in the traditional tort law context. Fraud-on-the-FDA claims are

467. See Tarloff, supra note 81, at 1223.
468. In traditional state law tort claims the violation of the FDCA regulation is
only needed to show breach. See id. at 1220.
469. Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1234 (9th Cir. 2013) (Watford, J.,
concurring).
470. See McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 2005).
471. See supra notes 159–63, 383–93 and accompanying text.
472. See Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1234.
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more likely to interfere with the regulatory objectives of the FDA
than state law tort claims. The Buckman court’s concerns that fraudon-the-FDA claims would (1) interfere with FDA decision-making,
(2) cause manufacturers to submit unnecessary information to the
FDA, and (3) deter manufacturers from seeking § 510(k) approval,
are not as legitimate in the failure-to-warn-context.
First, the Buckman court was concerned that jury verdicts
regarding fraud-on-the-FDA claims could interfere with FDA
decision-making. The United States as amicus curiae in Stengel
expressed the same concern with regulatory interference in regards to
the plaintiffs’ third-party duty-to-warn theory.473 Under this theory,
the plaintiff would have to prove that if the FDA received adverse
event reports the FDA would have warned physicians. According to
the United States, this causation inquiry could lead to jury secondguessing of the FDA decision-making process. However, the
potential for a conflict between juries and the FDA is reduced in
cases such as Stengel and Hughes, where FDA warning letters state
that the manufacturer has not complied with the FDA.474
Second, the Buckman court held that fraud-on-the-FDA claims
would create a “deluge of information that the Administration
neither wants nor needs,” which would hinder the FDA review
process.475 The risk of a deluge of information is less likely to occur in
the context of failure-to-warn-claims alleging that the manufacturer
failed to report adverse events. Since these claims are based on the
manufacturer’s conduct after the device has been approved, it is hard
to see how they will hinder the FDA pre-market approval process.
Further, in Stengel, plaintiff’s claim alleges that the manufacturer
violated FDA regulations requiring it to report serious injury or death
associated with its device. Reports on death and serious injuries are
exactly the kind of information that the FDA does want or need.476
Third, Buckman held that fraud-on-the-FDA claims would deter
manufacturers from applying for § 510(k) approval out of fear of civil
liability. It is unlikely that failure-to-warn claims premised on a
manufacturer’s post-approval conduct would deter manufacturers
from applying for PMA in the first place.
For these reasons, state-law tort claims do not interfere with the
FDA’s regulatory objectives in the same way as the claims in
Buckman. Accordingly, courts should start with the presumption
473.
474.
475.
476.

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 4, at 22.
See supra notes 376, 431 and accompanying text.
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 351 (2001).

See Tarloff, supra note 81, at 1227.
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against preemption when conducting an implied preemption analysis.
The presumption against preemption makes sense in the implied
preemption context because the text is not clear enough to erase the
presumption.477 Further, the presumption against preemption should
apply to traditional-law tort claims because such claims historically
have been in a field occupied by the states.478 State-law tort claims
are different than the claims in Buckman, in which the Supreme
Court refused to apply the presumption because “[p]olicing fraud
against federal agencies is hardly ‘a field which the States have
traditionally occupied.’”479
Another reason to attach the presumption against preemption is
the need for state-law claims to complement FDA enforcement
actions.480 The FDA does not have the capacity to ensure that
manufacturers are complying with FDA post-approval requirements
on their own. In contrast to Buckman, where the court held that the
FDA is amply equipped to police fraud, the FDA is far less equipped
to enforce its post-approval reporting requirements. In fact, both
GAO and FDA reports on post-market surveillance have found that
the FDA’s ability “to understand the risks of adverse events related
to the use of medical devices . . . is limited.”481 Among the causes for
the FDA’s limited post-market surveillance capacity is lack of time, as
the FDA cannot review all the reports they receive.482 Another
constraint is that the passive medical device reporting system relies on
the manufacturer to submit accurate and timely information.483 GAO
found accurate and timely submissions do not always occur.484
Therefore, state-law tort claims are needed to make up for the
deficiencies in the FDA post-market surveillance process.
CONCLUSION

Riegel made clear that state law claims that parallel federal
requirements escape preemption.485 However, Riegel left uncertain
477. A presumption against preemption is “the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
478. See supra notes 83–49.
479. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347.
480. See Tarloff, supra note 81, at 1229.
481. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 62, at 14.
482. See id.
483. See id. at 14–15.
484. See id.
485. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008).
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exactly which claims fall within the narrow gap, known as the parallel
claim exception. In the wake of Riegel, lower courts have adopted
conflicting interpretations of the contours of the narrow gap. While
the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have held that an industry-wide
violation is expressly preempted under Riegel, the Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have allowed these claims to fit through
the narrow gap. While the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have expanded
Buckman to impliedly preempt state law tort claims, the Fifth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have again allowed these claims to fit
through the narrow gap.
Stengel, the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision, in pending certiorari,
had the opportunity to clarify the confusion surrounding the narrow
gap. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court avoided the issue, thereby
perpetuating the confusion. In a subsequent Class III medical device
case involving parallel claims, the Supreme Court should grant
certiorari because a parallel claim should not survive preemption in
some circuits, but not in others. It is likely that the divide amongst
the circuits will continue to widen, and it is only a matter of time
before the Supreme Court will have to clarify the contours of the
parallel claim doctrine. In clarifying the scope of the parallel claim
doctrine, the Supreme Court should preserve a sufficiently sized gap
for plaintiff’s claims to avoid preemption. This is consistent with the
Supreme Court precedent that has recognized that plaintiffs need
some means of judicial recourse.486 Parallel claims are also needed to
complement FDA oversight of medical devices, which is inadequate
to enforce compliance with post-approval requirements by itself.
A violation of a generally applicable requirement such as the MDR
should be sufficient to survive both express and implied preemption.
To require plaintiff to plead a device-specific requirement to escape
express preemption would unnecessarily narrow or maybe even
eliminate the parallel claim exception. Once a plaintiff escapes
express preemption by alleging a state law tort claim premised on a
violation of an industry-wide requirement, he should not have to face
the additional burden of proving his claim is not impliedly preempted.
Implied preemption of state law tort claims would also essentially
close the narrow gap left open for plaintiffs, in contravention of
Buckman and Riegel’s intent to keep the gap open. It should be
recognized that constricting the gap, as the Eighth Circuit has done, is
neither sound public policy nor supported by precedent.
486. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 266 (1984) (holding that “it
is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of
judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct”).

354

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLII

In the alternative, to ensure that plaintiffs still have a remedy, the
Court could rule that generally applicable requirements such as the
MDR have no preemptive effect. This ruling is supported by Lohr. If
the MDR has no preemptive effect then plaintiff could prevail on the
theory that the manufacturer should have strengthened its warnings
pursuant to the CBE regulation. A claim premised on a CBE
regulation should survive implied preemption because it is based on
traditional state law. Further, the Supreme Court held in Wyeth that
a claim premised on the CBE regulation survives implied preemption
including both obstacle and conflict preemption.487
However, holding that a generally applicable requirement has no
preemptive effect and then following Wyeth’s implied preemption
rationale in regards to medical devices would effectively eliminate the
parallel claim exception that the Supreme Court has vigorously tried
to preserve.488 Instead of looking to device-specific requirements in
the PMA, plaintiffs would rely on vague and open-ended industrywide requirements to escape dismissal. This probably was not the
result the Supreme Court intended.489 Therefore, recognizing the
parallel claim exception but widening it enough to provide means of
judicial recourse seems to be the best option.

487. See supra, notes 386–92 and accompanying text.
488. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996);
see also Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2477 (2013). The Court has
recognized the parallel claim exception in each of these cases.
489. See Riegel 552 U.S. at 323–30. In Riegel, the Court, which held that a state
law claim is preempted when a manufacturer complies with PMA requirements,
expressed concern about state law tort claims imposing different or additional
requirements under § 360k. For instance, the Court said “state tort law that requires
a manufacturer’s catheters to be safer, but hence less effective, than the model the
FDA has approved disrupts the federal scheme no less than state regulatory law to
the same effect.” Id. at 325. Hence, the Supreme Court would likely find that a ruling
that all generally applicable regulations had no preemptive effect would similarly
disrupt the federal scheme. This is because such a ruling would widen the door for
plaintiffs who rely on violations of vague and open-ended standards.

